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1 Executive summary
On 11 December 1997, delegates to the third conference of the Parties to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change agreed upon the Kyoto Protocol. The protocol sets binding
emission targets for developed nations (Annex B countries). 1 The Protocol states that Annex
B countries may participate in emission trading. The rules for emission trading are to be
discussed at the fourth Conference of the Parties in November 1998.
The aim of the report is to discuss the potential gains from emission trading and to raise some
crucial questions. The advantages in the form of reduced abatement costs are a basic features
of emission trading. The numerical example presented shows that the total costs of the Kyoto
Protocol could be reduced by approximately 95% through emission trading. From the Nordic
perspective it is important to note that Denmark and Norway and to some extent also Sweden
are probably among the Annex B countries benefiting most from this trading. Finland will not
benefit to the same extent from this trading because of lower estimated abatement costs in
this country.
Emission trading is a policy option also in the domestic arenas. The Kyoto Protocol allocates
emission limitations (quotas) to each of the Annex B countries. The governments of these
countries might consider allocating these quotas further to domestic enterprises as emission
permits. If such allocation takes place new markets for greenhouse gas (GHG) emission
quotas and permits might emerge domestically as well as internationally. The costsaving
potentials are probably significant also with domestic emission trading. Here, however,
emission taxes could be implemented and give a correspondingly cost-effective solution. It is
in that respect important to underline that the protocol does not set restrictions on national
choice of policy instruments.
The report emphasizes that emission trading at the national and international levels must be
discussed separately. The Nordic governments, for example, will find several good reasons
for supporting emission trading at the international level, although emission trading in
greenhouse gases may not be the preferred policy instrument domestically. The Nordic
countries have already implemented domestic taxes on CO 2-emissions. This tax policy could
be sustained while the Nordic governments support and take part in emission trading at the
international level.
Even though we realize that international emission trading can significantly reduce the
Nordic countries implementation costs and may be a necessary condition to ensure that a high
number of countries ratify the Kyoto Protocol, some undesirable side effects cannot be
ignored. According to projected emission levels in the future, the protocol gives at least some
of the countries in transition to a market economy (the EIT countries) emission limitations
above their business-as-usual (BAU) emissions. Free emission trading among Annex B
countries would then reduce total abatement compared to a situation where the quotas are
non-tradeable. We will refer to this as the ‘hot air’ problem in connection to emission trading.
                                                  
1 Annex B countries are the countries listed in Annex B in the Kyoto Protocol (the OECD countries (except
Korea, Mexico and Turkey), EU, which is a Party to the Convention, contries that are undergoing a process of
transition to a market economy, and Liechtenstein and Monaco).
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1.1 The gains from trade
Figure 1.1 shows the calculated distribution of costs of the Kyoto Protocol.2 The European
Union (EU) has distributed its quota to the member countries in accordance with the internal
EU distribution plan agreed upon in June 1998. 3
Figure 1: Costs of implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. Both terms-of-trade changes
due to price changes in the energy markets and benefits from revenue recycling are
taken into account. The internal EU distribution plan agreed upon in June 1998 is
internalized (see footnote 3).
Four cases are analyzed in the report. In the first case no emission trading is allowed. In the
second case only the Nordic countries are allowed to trade with each other. In the third
                                                  
2 The numerical examples are produced by simulation of a model developed at CICERO. An earlier version of
the model is described in detail in Holtsmark (1997). Cf. Ringius, Torvanger and Holtsmark (1998) for another
application of the model.
3 The quotas of Denmark, Finland and Sweden are 79, 100 and 104 percent of their respective 1990 emissions.
The fact that Denmark has to reduce the emissions substantially between 1990 and the first commitment period,
while Finland and Sweden only should stabilise or increase the emissions in this period, explains to a large
extent why Sweden and Finland according to the simulations experience small or even negative costs, while
Denmark experiences substantial net costs.
Costs after terms of trade changes
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scenario, the trade region is extended to include the entire Annex II countries. 4 Finally, we
look at the case where emission trading is free within Annex B. In the last case the total costs
of the Annex B countries are reduced by approximately 95% compared with the case without
trade.
Especially Denmark, Norway, Canada, USA, Australia and the EIT countries will receive
significant benefits from emission trading. This is related to both especially high or low
abatement costs in these countries as well as either a strict or flexible emission target.
Countries with more average abatement cost patterns will not benefit to the same extent from
emission trading. The emission targets of Australia and Russia are for example likely to give
these countries some flexibility and the possibility to attain gains from quota sale.
A basic result of the presented model simulations is that the EIT countries are large quota
sellers, while in general the traditional market economies as a group are buyers of quotas.
Hence, if there are no limitations on the trading, an outcome could be reduced abatement
efforts in the traditional market economies. Significant ‘no regret’ options for emission
reductions in the EIT countries mean that these countries experience net benefits even in a
situation of no emission trading.
1.2 Long-term impacts of emission trading
It is important to recall that the global emission reductions that will be achieved by the Kyoto
Protocol are very limited. The emissions are likely to continue to grow in the rest of the world
(non-Annex B countries) as long as new renewable energy production loses in the
competition with fossil fuels. Therefore, a crucial question is how a climate agreement should
be designed in order to encourage the technological development within new renewable
energy production.
Emission trading reduces the costs of abatement, which again will reduce the demand for
non-polluting or emission efficient technologies. Hence, emission trading could reduce the
R&D incentives in these areas, and consequently the long-term environmental impacts of the
agreement.
1.3 Policy recommendations
· The report recommends a controlled introduction of emission trading through different
phases. Possible undesirable side effects will then probably be detected in time to be
corrected.
· In the first phase some restrictions on trade is recommended. The parties should be
restricted to sell only a certain share of their quotas. The restriction on trade must be seen
in relation to the compliance and sanction mechanisms that will be applied.
· At the end of the first phase, the Conference of the Parties (COP) should review
experiences from transboundary emission trading between governments of Annex B
parties. On the basis of this review the COP can decide whether the restrictions on the
emission trading should be relaxed.
                                                  
4 Annex II countries are the countries listed in Annex II in the Climate Convention (the OECD countries as of
1992 and EU).
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· The report recommends that an international institution is designated to approve all quota-
sales. All transfers of emission quotas across borders should be followed by a report to
the designated institution. These reports must contain a plan from the seller of quotas,
specifying how the corresponding increased need for abatement measures will be
designed and implemented.
· In the national arena, there is a choice between carbon taxes and allocation of tradeable
emission permits. The Nordic countries’ governments should investigate further these two
alternatives. However, due to the attained experience with carbon taxes this is probably
the preferred policy instrument in these countries.
· If several governments in the first phase introduced emission-trading systems in the
national arenas, in the second phase they should consider whether these markets could be
integrated. Transboundary trade with both government and business could then emerge.
The national government, however, should be responsible for the national compliance. At
this stage the non-Annex B countries could be invited to accept emission limitations in
order to be able to join the quota market.
1.4 Overview of the report
In chapter 3 the proposed stepwise introduction of emission trading is further elaborated.
Chapter 4 describes how a trading regime works and could be constructed. Chapter 5
discusses advantages and disadvantages of emission trading both at the national and the
international level.
Chapter 6 discusses the potential gains from emission trading in the light of other empirically
based studies. Chapter 7 presents some numerical examples to illustrate how emission trade
could affect the different countries total abatement costs and costs related to terms of trade
changes that follows when several countries implement measures simultaneously. Chapter 8
provides a short look at other studies and experiences with emission trading.
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2 Norsk sammendrag
11. desember 1997 ble delegatene til klimakonvensjonens tredje partsmøte enige om teksten i
Kyoto-protokollen. Protokollen setter bindende utslippsrestriksjoner for alle Anneks B-
landene. 5 Protokollen fastslår også at Anneks B-landene kan handle med utslippskvoter.
Regler og retningslinjer for slik handel vil bli diskutert på det neste Partsmøtet i Buenos Aires
i november 1998.
Målet for denne rapporten er å diskutere den potensielle nytten av handel med kvoter
samtidig som det blir reist noen kritiske spørsmål. Et viktig trekk ved kvotehandel er
gevinstene i form av reduserte kostnader ved utslippsreduksjoner. Det numeriske eksempelet
som presenteres i kapittel 7 i rapporten viser at de totale kostnadene av Kyoto-protokollen
kan reduseres med omkring 95 prosent gjennom handel med kvoter.
I et nordisk perspektiv er det viktig at Danmark, Norge og til en viss grad Sverige
sannsynligvis er blant de Annex B- landene som vil tjene mest på slik handel. Finland ligger
imidlertid ikke i samme grad an til tjene på handel med kvoter. Dette skyldes at de estimerte
kostnadene ved å redusere utslippene er lavere i Finland enn i de andre nordiske landene.
Handel med utslippskvoter er også aktuelt på det nasjonale plan. Kyoto-protokollen fordeler
utslippsrettigheter (kvoter) til alle Anneks B-landene. Myndighetene i disse landene kan så
vurdere om de ønsker å distribuere sine kvoter videre til nasjonale aktører i form av
nasjonale kvoter. Dersom de velger å gjøre det, kan markeder for omsettbare kvoter oppstå
nasjonalt så vel som internasjonalt.
Potensialet for kostnadsreduksjoner er sannsynligvis stort også når det gjelder innenlandsk
handel med kvoter. På det nasjonale plan kan en imidlertid oppnå en tilsvarende
kostnadseffektiv løsning ved å innføre avgifter på utslipp. Det er i den forbindelse viktig å
understreke at Kyoto-protokollen ikke legger noen restriksjoner på de enkelt lands valg av
nasjonale virkemidler.
Handel med kvoter på nasjonalt og internasjonalt nivå bør i stor grad diskuteres hver for seg.
Det er lett å se at de nordiske landenes myndigheter vil ha mange grunner til å støtte handel
med kvoter på internasjonalt nivå, selv om handel med kvoter ikke gjennomføres på nasjonalt
nivå i disse landene. De nordiske landene har allerede innført karbonavgifter innenlands.
Denne avgiftspolitikken kan opprettholdes samtidig som de nordiske lands myndigheter
støtter og deltar i handelen på internasjonalt nivå.
Selv om det er åpenbart at kvotehandel både kan redusere de nordiske landenes kostnader
betydelig og være helt nødvendig for å få tilstrekkelig antall land til å ratifisere protokollen,
er det enkelte uønskede effekter som ikke kan overses. Kyoto-protokollen tillater
sannsynligvis noen land å slippe ut mere klimagasser enn det en kan anslå at deres "business
as usual" (BAU) utslipp vil bli. Dette gjelder noen av landene med overgangsøkonomier
(EIT-landene). Ubegrenset kvotehandel blant Anneks B landene vil da helt klart redusere de
samlede utslippsreduksjoner sammenlignet med en situasjon hvor kvotene ikke er
omsettelige. Vi omtaler dette som "hot air"- problemet i forbindelse med kvotehandel.
                                                  
5 Annex B land er de som er listet opp i Annex B i Kyoto protokollen (OECD-landene (untatt Korea, Mexico og
Tyrkia), EU, som er en egen part til klimakonvensjonen,  land med overgangsøkonomier og Liechtenstein og
Monaco).
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2.1 Gevinster av kvotehandel
Figur 2.1 viser den beregnete fordelingen av kostnader av Kyoto-protokollen. 6 Det er lagt til
grunn at EUs samlede kvote er fordelt til medlemsstatene i overensstemmelse med den
interne EU-fordelingen som det ble enighet om i juni 1998. 7
Figur 2: Kostnader av implementering av Kyoto protokollen. Både bytteforholds-
gevinster som følge av prisendringer i energimarkene og gevinster av proveny-
resirkulering er tatt hensyn til. Den interne EU-fordelingen vedtatt i juni 1998 er lagt til
grunn (se fotnote 7).
Fire situasjoner er analysert. I den første tillates ikke kvotehandel. I den andre tillates kun de
nordiske landene å handle med hverandre. I den tredje situasjonen utvider vi handelsregionen
                                                  
6 Beregningene er utført med en modell utviklet ved CICERO. En tidligere versjon av modellen er nærmere
beskrevet i Holtsmark (1997). Se også Ringius, Torvanger and Holtsmark (1998) for en annen anvendelse av
denne modellen.
7 Kvotene for Danmark,Finland og Sverige er 79, 100 og 104 prosent av de respektive 1990-utslippene. Det
faktum at Danmark må redusere utslippene betydelig fra 1990 til den første forpliktelsesperioden, samtidig som
Finland og Sverige bare må stabilisere eller svakt kan øke utslippene i denne perioden, forklarer for en stor del
hvorfor Danmark i henhold til beregningene må regne med betydelige nettokostnader som følge av Kyoto-
protokollen, mens Finland og Sverige er antatt å slippe billigere fra det.
Kostnader av Kyoto-protokollen
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til å omfatte alle Annex II landene. 8 Til slutt analyseres en situasjon hvor kvotehandel kan
skje uhindret innen Annex B. I det siste tilfellet reduseres totalkostnadene til Annex B-
landene med omkring 95 prosent sammenlignet med situasjonen uten handel.
Spesielt Danmark, Norge, Canada, USA, Australia og EIT-landene vil få spesielt store
gevinster av kvotehandel. Dette skyldes at disse landene enten har spesielt høye eller lave
reduksjonskostnader eller en tøff/fleksibel utslippskvote. Land med mer gjennomsnittlige
kostnader ved utslippsreduksjoner vil ikke i samme grad få nytteeffekter av handel. De
relativt romslige utslippskvotene til Russland og Australia vil for eksempel trolig gi disse
landene en stor grad av fleksibilitet og mulighet til å tjene på kvotesalg.
Et grunnleggende resultat er at EIT-landene selger kvoter, mens de tradisjonelle
markedsøkonomiene i tilfellet med fri handel samlet sett kjøper kvoter. Hvis det ikke settes
begrensninger på handelen, kan derfor resultatet bli reduserte utslippsreduserende tiltak i de
tradisjonelle markedsøkonomiene. Store såkalte ”ikke-angre-tiltak” i EIT-landene er
forklaringen på at EIT-landene er anslått å oppleve netto gevinst av en klimaavtale selv uten
kvotehandel.
2.2 Langsiktige konsekvenser av kvotehandel
Det er viktig å være klar over at de globale utslippsreduksjonene som følger av Kyoto-
protokollen er svært begrenset. Utslippene vil sannsynligvis fortsette å øke i de land som ikke
inngår i Anneks B-gruppen så lenge ny fornybar energiproduksjon taper i konkurransen med
fossile brensler. Et sentralt spørsmål er derfor hvordan en klimaavtale bør utformes for å
oppmuntre til teknologisk utvikling innen ny fornybar energiproduksjon.
Kvotehandel reduserer kostnadene ved utslippsreduksjon, som igjen vil redusere
etterspørselen etter ikke-forurensende eller utslippseffektive teknologiske løsninger.
Kvotehandel kan derfor komme til å redusere motivene for å satse på forskning og utvikling
på disse områdene og kan følgelig også svekke den langsiktige miljøeffekten av en avtale.
2.3 Anbefalinger - tiltak og virkemidler
· Rapporten anbefaler en kontrollert, gradvis innføring av kvotehandel gjennom ulike faser.
Mulige alvorlige sideeffekter vil derved kunne oppdages i tide til å bli korrigert.
· I den første fasen anbefales visse begrensninger på handelen. De enkelte lands regjeringer
bør tillates bare å selge en viss andel av sine kvoter. Størrelsen på denne andelen bør sees
i forhold til de kontroll- og sanksjonsmekanismene som vil bli brukt.
· Ved slutten av første fase bør partskonferansen (COP) vurdere erfaringene fra
mellomstatlig kvotehandel mellom Annex-B land. På bakgrunn av denne vurderingen kan
COP avgjøre hvorvidt begrensningene på kvotehandelen kan gjøres mer romslige.
· Rapporten anbefaler at en internasjonal institusjon tillegges ansvaret for å godkjenne alt
salg av kvoter. Alle overføringer av utslippskvoter over landegrenser bør følges opp med
en rapport til ovennevnte institusjon. Disse rapportene må inneholde en plan fra landet
som selger kvotene om hvordan det økte behovet for utslippsreduksjoner vil bli planlagt
og gjennomført.
                                                  
8 Annex II land er de som er listet opp i Annex II i klimakonvensjonen (OECD-landene pr. 1992 og EU).
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· På de nasjonale arenaer står valget mellom karbonavgifter og fordeling av omsettelige
kvoter for CO2-utslipp. De nordiske landenes myndigheter bør utforske disse to
alternativene videre. I forhold til erfaringene en allerede har med karbonavgifter er dette
sannsynligvis det virkemiddelet som bør foretrekkes i disse landene.
· Hvis mange land i den første fasen innfører kvotehandelssystemer på de nasjonale arenaer
bør en i andre fase vurdere om disse markedene kan integreres. På denne måten kan det
utvikles mellomstatlig handel både med myndigheter og næringsliv som aktører. De
nasjonale regjeringer bør likevel være ansvarlig for at den samlede nasjonale målsettingen
nås. På dette stadiet kan land utenfor Annex B inviteres til å akseptere
utslippsbegrensninger for å være i stand til å slutte seg til kvotemarkedet.
2.4 Oversikt over rapporten
Kapittel 3 utdyper blant annet den foreslåtte gradvise innføringen av kvotehandel. Kapittel 4
beskriver hvordan markeder for kvotehandel kan bygges opp og fungere. Kapittel 5
diskuterer fordeler og ulemper ved kvotehandel både på nasjonalt og internasjonalt nivå.
Kapittel 6 diskuterer potensiell nytte av kvotehandel i lys av andre empirisk baserte studier.
Kapittel 7 presenterer noen numeriske eksempler for å illustrere hvordan kvotehandel kan
påvirke de ulike landenes totale reduksjonskostnader og kostnader relatert til endringer i
handelsregimer som følger når mange land gjennomfører tiltak samtidig. Kapittel 8 gir en
kort gjennomgang av andre studier og erfaringer med kvotehandel.
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3 Introduction
3.1 Historical background
For more than one decade at least parts of the international community have realized the need
for a climate convention that limits the global emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs). A
number of intergovernmental conferences focusing on climate change were held in the late
1980s and early 1990s. Together with increasing scientific evidence, these conferences
helped to raise international concern about the issue and the question whether an international
law could be established. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released
its First Assessment Report in 1990. It had a powerful effect on both policy-makers and the
public and provided the basis for negotiations on the Climate Change Convention.
In December 1990, the UN General Assembly approved the start of treaty negotiations. The
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change
(INC/FCCC) met for five sessions between February 1991 and May 1992. Negotiators from
150 countries finalized the proposal for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC) in June 1992 just before the Rio "Earth Summit". 154 states (plus the EC) signed the
Convention in Rio. Later on the Convention has been ratified by more than 160 states and
should now be considered as international law.
In March 1995 the first conference of the parties (COP-1) to the Convention took place in
Berlin. The key action of the COP-1 was the adoption of the decision, the so-called “Berlin-
Mandate”, that concludes “that the present commitments under the Convention, notably the
commitments of developed countries to take measures aimed at returning to their level of
GHG emissions of 1990 by the end of the century, are not adequate”.
The Berlin Mandate established a process that would enable the Parties to take appropriate
actions for the period beyond 2000, including strengthening of developed countries’
commitments, through adoption of a protocol or another legal instrument. Most important
was the setting of quantified limitation and reduction objectives (QELROs) within specified
time frames. The Berlin Mandate furthermore stated that there should be no new
commitments for developing countries.
At the third conference of the Parties (COP-3) the delegates agreed upon the Kyoto Protocol.
The protocol sets differentiated binding emission limitations for developed nations  (Annex
B-countries) for the commitment period 2008-2012. The specific emission limits vary from
country to country. The different Parties’ emission limitations are listed in appendix B.
The combined result of individual country targets is estimated to result in an overall reduction
in Annex B countries’ GHG emissions by 5,2 % from the 1990 levels by the commitment
period 2008-2012 (averaged across the period). The emission targets include all six groups of
GHGs not included in the Montreal Protocol. There are, however, several important aspects
of the protocol that remain to be negotiated. Among them are the rules for emission tradeing.
The Protocol states that “Parties included in Annex B may participate in emission trading for
the purpose of fulfilling their commitments … …  Any such trading shall be supplemental to
domestic actions for the purpose of meeting quantified emission limitations and reduction
commitments… ” (article 16 bis). The rules and guidelines are to be discussed at the fourth
Conference of the Parties (COP-4) in November 1998.
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3.2 Basic concepts
In the two subsections below we explore the distinction between emission quotas and
emission permits and abatement costs and protocol costs as we use these basic concepts in
this report.
3.2.1 Quotas and permits
It is our perception that it is especially important to emphasize and clarify the difference
between domestic emission trading between enterprises within the different countries, and
transboundary emission trading between governments. In accordance with most literature we
use the term emission quotas for the national emission limitations specified in a protocol. The
term emission permits are used for emission limitations allocated by a national government to
domestic enterprises. In accordance with these definitions there could be an international
market for emission quotas. In this market governments could be buying and selling quotas.
At the same time there could be different national markets for emission permits. The
participators are here domestic enterprises.
National markets for emission permits could be integrated with the international market for
emission quotas. In that case the governments should allow national emitters to exchange
their permits with the international tradeable quotas their receptively governments hold and
hence trade directly on the international market.
3.2.2 Abatement costs and protocol costs
A country’s efforts in order to reduce its emissions of greenhouse gases will normally
decrease the net national income in the country. The reduced national income is called the
abatement costs. The abatement costs could be low or even zero for small emission reduction
levels. If the national economic policy in the first place is inefficiently designed the
abatement costs could in some cases be zero or even negative because emission reductions in
such cases could be achieved just by the implementation of a more efficient economic policy
in the country under consideration.
A climate protocol specifying national emission quotas will have a number of economic
consequences in addition to the costs each country with a quota will experience when taking
action to reduce the national emissions. International trade patterns will be affected. Hence
the prices in these markets will be altered. Especially significant price changes are likely to
occur in the energy markets. Large fossil fuel exporters will for example probably experience
reduced income if a strong climate agreement is implemented.
Such changes represent costs that come in addition to the abatement costs mentioned in the
above paragraph. We could talk about protocol costs, which therefore have a broader
meaning than the costs connected only to national abatement efforts. It is however important
to have in mind that some countries’ protocol costs will be lower than their abatement costs
because the terms of trade changes give them a net gain. Fossil fuel net importers will for
example probably experience considerably terms of trade gains.
3.3 Emission quotas and trading
The Kyoto Protocol sets quantified emission limitations for all Annex B countries relative to
their 1990 levels. This correspond to an allocation of quotas to the Annex B countries, where
the amount of quotas is equal to the amount of emission following from the emission
limitations set out in the protocol.
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In this report we will clarify the concepts related to quota trading, and discuss advantages and
disadvantages. We analyze emission trading both at the international and the national levels.
The Annex B  countries’ governments might consider whether they in their domestic arena
should allocate their quotas to domestic business. If such allocation takes place emission
trading could be a policy option also in the domestic arenas. We emphasize however that
emission trading at the international and national levels has to be discussed separately.
Governments could find several good reasons for supporting emission trading at the
international level although they do not see tradeable emission quotas as their first choice in
their domestic climate policies.
The advantage in the form of reduced total abatement costs is a basic feature of emission
trading at both levels. In the case of greenhouse gases, the potentials for reduced abatement
costs through emission trading is also large according to several empirically based
investigations. The numerical example presented in chapter 7 estimates for example that the
total abatement costs of the Kyoto Protocol could be reduced by 95% through emission
trading.  Other studies referred to in chapter 6 provide similar estimates. Similar cost saving
potentials could be found by domestic emission trading. Implementation of emission taxes
could, however, be implemented and nationally give a corresponding cost-effective solution.
Emission trading may not be the preferred policy instrument at the national level. A
prerequisite for emission trading to take place is that emission quotas are allocated. In the
domestic arena, the allocation of GHG-emission quotas has not taken place in any countries
so far. At this level emission taxes is also a good alternative to the allocation of domestic
emission permits. We emphasize that not least the Nordic countries have attained experience
with carbon taxes. Further refinements of these climate policy measures are coupled with less
degree of uncertainty compared with the design and implementation of national systems for
allocation of tradeable permits. We discuss this further in section 5.3.
In the international arena, the situation is quite different. The Kyoto Protocol implies that
emission quotas is the main instrument at the international level. The question now is to what
extent these quotas should tradable. Quota trade can significantly reduce the countries’ cost
of the protocol. There are, however, arguments for keeping the quota trade within limits.
Firstly, completely free trade could mean a less effective agreement due to low degrees of
compliance. We discuss this further in section 5.2. Secondly, the long-term impact of
emission trading on technological development is an uncertain factor. One can sometimes
miss a realistic approach to what could be achieved by a climate agreement limiting only the
Annex B countries to small emission reductions. The effect on global emissions of
greenhouse gases will be very limited, because the developing countries are in a phase of
their economic development with high growth in GHG emissions. Due to the leakage effect a
climate protocol could furthermore aggravate this emission growth. 9 The effect on emission
reduction in the long term through an accelerated technological development including new
renewable energy might therefor turn out to be more important than the short-term emission
reductions.
A main result of emission trading is likely to be a net transfer of emission quotas from the
EIT-countries to traditional market economies, cf. chapter 7 . Hence, emission trading will
reduce the pressure on industries in the traditional market economies to reduce their
emissions of greenhouse gases. In chapter 5 we discuss whether this could delay the
important technological development, for example new renewable energy.
                                                  
9 See section 4.3 for an explanation of the concept ‘leakage effect’.
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3.4 Phases in the development of GHG trading markets
Although one should be aware of possible undesirable side effects of emission trading, it can
not be ignored that emission trading might significantly reduce the abatement costs.
Consequently the parties could have increased willingness to ratify the Kyoto Protocol if
emission trading is allowed. On the other hand, since some undesirable side effects of
emission trading might not be known at the present stage or their degree of seriousness is not
well known, a stepwise approach to emission trading should be considered. Table 3.1
sketches three possible main phases in the development of a global emission-trading regime.
In the first phase the Kyoto Protocol enter into force. The protocol could at this stage allow
limited trade in emission quotas between Annex B governments. For example, each
government could only be allowed to sell a certain share of its quotas to other governments.
The Kyoto Protocol states (article 16 bis) that quota trade should be “supplemental” to
domestic actions. The Protocol may therefore, at least initially, also restrict the purchase of
quotas.
The Kyoto Protocol (article 4) states that a group of countries can pool their target and be in
compliance as long as total emissions for all countries included in the “bubble” does not
exceed the sum of the individual’ emission targets. This implies that EU can allocate the total
amount of quotas of all EU members according to the allocation rule EU chooses.
At the national level the governments in the Annex B countries choose policy instruments
within their countries. Some countries will probably develop plans for gradually increasing
their CO2-taxes and other taxes on GHG emissions and thereby cost-effectively bring the
GHG-emissions in accordance with the national commitments within the specified
timeframes. Other governments will design national systems for allocation of tradeable
emission permits.
At the end of the first phase, the Conference of the Parties (COP) should review experiences
from transboundary emission trading between governments of Annex B parties. On the basis
of this review the COP should decide whether emission trading should be expanded or be
completely free.
If several governments in the first phase introduced emission-trading systems in the national
arenas, one should in the second phase consider whether these markets could be integrated.
Each national government could let permit holders exchange domestic permits against the
international quotas. The national governments will however be responsible for the national
compliance, whether they have allocated quotas to national business or not. Hence, the
national governments must be free to choose whether their domestic permit holders should be
allowed to participate in the international quota market. At this stage the non-Annex B
countries could be invited to accept emission limitations in order to be able to join the quota
market.
CICERO Report 1998:1
Emission Trading under the Kyoto Protocol
19
Table 1: Possible phases in the development of a global market for GHG emission
quotas
National level International level
Phase 1
The Annex B governments are
free to use taxes or quotas in their
domestic policies
· Some governments may
allocate national permits to
business, and introduce
domestic emission trading.
· Other governments will use
emission taxes and not
allocate permits.
· The Kyoto Protocol enter into
force.
· An international institution is
designated to approve, register
and control the emission
trading.
· Limited trade in GHGs
between governments.
· An EU-quota is allocated to
the member countries.
Phase 2
· National governments are free
to choose whether domestic
business should be free to take
part in the international quota
market. Governments are
nevertheless responsible for
national compliance.
· Non-Annex B governments
having accepted national
emission limitations may
allocate the national permits to
business, and introduce
domestic emission trading.
· Free trade in GHGs between
Annex B governments and
business.
· Non-Annex B countries are
invited to accept emission
limitations in order to join the
quota market.
Phase 3 · Free trade in GHGs involving both Annex B parties and non-Annex
B parties having accepted national emission limitations. Both
governments and business could take part in the trade.
In addition, in phase 3 the emission trading in the preceding phases should be evaluated.
Important objects for evaluation will be the parties having sold quotas and their degree of
compliance. The evaluation will constitute the basis when deciding whether the emission
trading market should be further developed and expanded. If the experiences are promising a
global market involving both governments and business in both Annex B and non-Annex B
countries could emerge in this phase.
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4 Design of a trading regime
The construction of a global climate policy could be seen as a two-level game. The national
arenas constitute the bottom level of the game, where the governments, business companies
and the public are the participants. The international climate negotiations constitute the top
level of the game.
The goal of the negotiations (the top level of the game) is to find a solution that fits well into
likely solutions at the bottom level of the game. Moreover, it is here important to keep in
mind that, on the bottom level of the game, different countries will find different solutions
suitable for them. One of the challenges is, however, to agree upon a common solution at the
top level of the game.
The two main market-based policy instruments in greenhouse gas abatement are:
a) emission taxes, and
b) allocation of quotas.
At the national level, governments are free to choose different strategies. At the international
level (the top level of the game) there has been little controversy around quotas as the basic
instrument. Hence, at this level the discussion has concentrated around the question of what
countries should have emission limits, how ambitious they should be, whether the limits
should be differentiated, and whether the emission quotas could be traded.
The discussions at the national level are far more open. Several countries (Denmark, Finland,
Netherlands, and Norway) have implemented CO 2-taxes, whereas allocation of tradeable
CO2-permits has so far not taken place in any countries. 10 Under the Kyoto Protocol it is
likely that some countries will fulfill the commitments by the use of emission taxes, while
other governments will allocate permits.
Governments who choose to allocate emission permits domestically have to choose whether
this should be done through direct distribution of permits or by auctions. Auctions will
generate public income, but might be a less politically feasible solution. Furthermore, they
have to decide whether the permits should be tradeable.
4.1 What is emission trading?
Trade can only take place if there is a good to be traded. A basic prerequisite for emission
trading to take place, is that a number of emitters by some sort of a legal instrument are
restricted to keep their emissions within certain limits. The emission quotas or permits are the
goods being the object to trade.
Emission trading means that the emitters keeping emission quotas or permits exchange these
assets against an economic compensation. The essential point is that they have common
interests through cost-saving if their marginal costs are different.  11 If such differences exist,
it is in both emitters’ interests to make a deal where the emitter with high marginal abatement
costs receives quotas or permits from the emitter with low marginal abatement costs,
followed by an economic compensation going the opposite direction.
                                                  
10 Voluntary agreements are often seen as a separate alternative to emission quotas. We concider, however, that
a system with voluntary agreements on emission reductions in reality is a non-tradeable permits-system. The
only difference from an ordinary emission-permit systems is that the size of the permits are the outcome of
negotiations between business and government.
11 The marginal abatement cost is the costs related to reducing the emission by an additional unit greenhouse
gases.
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There might be very large cost saving potentials connected to such trade. In the numerical
example presented in chapter 7 of this report the total abatement costs are reduced by
approximately 95% if there is free trade among the Annex B countries.  Other studies shortly
mentioned in chapter 6 points in the same direction. All emitters taking part in the emission
trading are likely to obtain a part of the economic gains from the trade, cf. the discussion in
the appendix.
4.2 Who trades?
We have used government-government emission trading as a starting point for our analysis.
Quite independent of to what extent the COP-4 reaches consensus on rules for
intergovernmental emission trading at the international level, some governments might prefer
to open up for emission trading domestically. A prerequisite for emission trading is that the
emitters are subject to emission limits. Hence, domestic emission trading requires permits to
be allocated to individual, domestic emission sources such as industries, companies or
households.
It might be important to underline that the Kyoto Protocol do not force any government to
introduce emission trading domestically. Governments will be free to use other instruments
than tradeable permits, for example CO 2-taxes, in their domestic climate policy whether or
not emission trading takes place at the international level.
If, on the other hand, a number of countries allocate tradeable permits domestically, emission
trading might follow new pathways. Governments might decide to allow individual emission
sources such as industries and companies that are subject to emission limits, to participate in
the international emission trading system. The governments should then allow national
emitters to exchange their permits with the international tradeable quotas the government
holds and hence trade directly on the international market.
A further remark on the question of who is taking part in national emission markets is
needed. As underlined above, only individuals, households, firms or governments who
possess emission quotas or permits, could take part in emission trading. It is however
obviously not reasonable to allocate emission permits to every single household and firm in a
country. The administration costs would then be unacceptable large. In the case of CO 2, a
better strategy is to allocate the permits to the companies selling and distributing oil, coal,
and gas. Because there is a simple relationship between the amount of fossil fuels sold and
the final emission of CO 2, the companies could be allowed to sell certain amounts of fossil
fuels measured in CO 2-units. If permits are distributed in that way, these companies will be
the participants in an emission trading system.
4.3 Inclusion of non-Annex B parties in the trading system
The Kyoto Protocol does not set any limitations on the emissions from the developing
countries (non-Annex B countries). Hence, the protocol puts limits on a diminishing part of
the world’s emissions of greenhouse gases. This problem is pressing not least because the
policies and measures implemented in the Annex B countries in order to fulfill their
commitments in turn might lead to increased emissions in the non-Annex B countries.
This so-called leakage effect of a climate agreement with limited participation is partly
brought about by reduced demand for fossil fuels in the Annex B countries, falling prices and
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consequently increased consumption of fossil fuels in the non-Annex B countries.
Furthermore, in the long term it is likely that one will experience a movement of energy
intensive and polluting industries from countries implementing policies and measures to
those not taking steps to limit their emissions of CO 2 and other greenhouse gases.
The opportunity to take part in an emission trading system could provide the non-Annex B
countries with an incentive for accepting emission caps. When an international quota market
is established, there might be willingness in the developing countries to accepting emission
limitations and thereby join the quota market, cf. table 3.1 and the discussion of phases in 3.4.
If invitations are accepted, it could reduce the leakage problem.
The point is that a prerequisite for taking part in a market for emission permits is an emission
limit. A country with considerable possibilities for low-cost emission reductions could
therefore find it beneficial to accept an emission limit in order to be allowed to sell emission
quotas on the international market. In total, this could be beneficial to this country if the cost
of reaching the initial emission limit is less than the net gains the country will have from
participation in the emission trading market. It is, however, important to ensure that the
developing countries receive quotas that are below their BAU emissions in order to ensure
that no “hot air” trading occur (see discussion about “hot air” in section 5.2.2).
4.4 What is traded?
In the previous sections we discussed what is meant by emission trading, and who the trading
partners could be. In this section we discuss the definition of the traded commodity. A
prerequisite for a successful trading regime is that the traded commodity, (or commodities if
there are several types of quotas), is/are clearly defined. Furthermore, the trading regime
should be designed such that the total abatement achieved after trade has occurred are in
compliance with total abatement following from the initial distribution of the emission
limitations (or emission caps) across Parties.  A quota must be clearly defined with regard to
emission measurement and the time period the quota is valid for. It can also be valuable to
specify the country of origin of the quotas. These aspects will be further discussed below.
The amount of tradeable quotas distributed across the countries, which have binding emission
caps, depends on the rules for trading. If there are no restrictions on trade, the distribution of
tradeable quotas should correspond to the distribution of emission limitations. In an initial
phase of a trading regime, where there might be restrictions on trade, only a certain percent of
the Parties’ emission limits could be defined as tradeable quotas.
4.4.1 One quota or several quotas?
A quota system could comprise several types of quotas – one quota for each GHG, where the
emissions are measured by tonnes of the corresponding GHG - or one type of quota could
cover a basket of all the different GHGs. The quantified emission limitations specified in the
Kyoto Protocol are related to a basket of GHGs. The emissions reductions of the different
GHG in the basket are interchangeable. The emissions from the different cases are measured
by a common measure; CO2–equivalents.12
                                                  
12 GWPs (Global Warming Potentials) has been introduced as a tool for policymakers to compare the impact on
the climate of emissions of the different greenhouse gases. GWP is an index which defines the cumulative
radiative forcing between the present and some chosen later time horizon  caused by an unit mass gas emitted
now, expressed relative to the reference gas CO2. By the use of GWP one can translate GHGs into CO2-
equivalents. Although it is not explicitly stated in the Kyoto Protocal, it is consensus on choosing a time horizon
of 100 years.
CICERO Report 1998:1
Emission Trading under the Kyoto Protocol
23
Emissions of some types of GHGs are more difficult to monitor than others. Anthropogenic
emissions of CO2 are relatively easy to monitor because the emissions are almost directly
linked to the use of fossil fuels and land use changes. 13 Especially CO 2 emissions from
combustion of fossil fuels are easy to monitor. Observing, for instance, the reductions of
nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane (CH 4) emissions is more complicated than for CO 2 since the
emissions are more technology-specific, and varies with, among other things, the combustion
conditions.
Controlling and verifying emissions will have to rely on measurements and site inspections.
Monitoring problems can make it difficult to verify that countries are in compliance with
their emission limitation levels, because they can sell quotas well in excess of what is met by
increased national abatement (see section 5.2.1 for a further discussion about cheating).
Mullins and Baron (1997) suggest (before the Kyoto meeting) that, due to monitoring
problems, trade could, at least initially, be limited to trading only emission of CO 2. However,
                                                  
13 A minor part (2 % ) of the antropoghenic emissions of CO 2 is caused by cement production. (1991/1992
figures from World Resources Institute (1996)).
The impact of trade restrictions on abatement: A numerical example
For simplicity we assume that the country in our example only emits two types of GHGs;
Methane and CO 2. We will in the following compare three different situations for
international trade:
Situation A: One quota for a basket of GHG. No restriction on trade
Situation B: Separate quotas for all gases. Only international trade with CO 2 quotas is
allowed but the protocol allows for national exchange of emissions from the different
gases
Situation C: Separate quotas for all gases. Only trade with CO 2 quotas is allowed.
Assume that a country in situation A finds it optimal to sell quotas corresponding to 20
tonnes of CO2 equivalents. This is met by an increase in national abatement of CO 2 by 10
tonnes and abatement of Methane by 10 tonnes of CO2 - equivalents to ensure
compliance.
Given the same international price of CO 2 quotas in situation B as the price of quotas
measured in CO 2 - equivalents in situation A, the country will in situation B find it
optimal to sell CO2-quotas corresponding to 20 tones CO2-equivalents. Since the national
abatement costs are the same whether trade of both types of quotas are allowed or not,
the country will increase abatement of CO 2 by 10 tonnes and Methane by 10 tonnes of
CO2 equivalents in order to be in compliance with the climate agreement. Hence, the
restrictions on trade will not alter the country’s optimal distribution of abatement across
gases compared to situation A.
The restrictions on trade in situation B did not imply restrictions on the distribution of
abatement across gases within each country or on trade in CO 2 quotas. This imply that
the international price on CO 2 quotas and the total trade measured in CO 2 equivalents,
and the distribution of abatement across countries and across gases will be identical in the
two situations.
Furthermore, if the country wanted to cheat by reporting more abatement of methane than
it had carried out, this could as well be done in a regime where trade was restricted to
only CO2 quotas as in a regime with no restrictions on trade. However, in situation C the
country could not meet the sale of CO2 quotas by increased abatement of methane. This
would thus reduce the countries’ incentive to report fictive reductions of methane .
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restricting trade to only CO2 emissions would imply that the Kyoto Protocol would have to
specify separate quotas CO2 in order to secures that emission reductions of CO 2 could not be
exchanged with emission reductions of other GHGs. This is illustrated by a numerical
example in the text box.
A system with separate non-interchangeable quotas for the different GHGs will increase the
cost of the climate agreement because it prevents countries from distributing abatement cost
effectively across gases both nationally and internationally. It is therefore a trade-off between
reducing the possibilities for cheating (or miscalculating) and increasing the cost–
effectiveness in the design of a trading regime. Since the Kyoto Protocol sets emission
limitations for a basket of gases it is probably unlikely that separate quotas for the different
GHGs gases will be assessed in the discussion for the rules for a global trading regime at the
next COP-4.
4.4.2 Time period
A quota could define the right to a certain amount of emissions in a fixed year or over a
certain time period, or a quota could specify repeated emissions over subsequent periods
(years).14  The emission targets specified in the Kyoto Protocol are to be reached over a five–
year commitment period. That is, the average emissions per year during the commitment
period can not exceed the emission limitations specified in the protocol. The choice of a
commitment period opposed to a certain target year increases the flexibility of the protocol.
This flexibility should also be accounted for in a trading regime. The quotas should therefore
be period-specific, which means that they give the right to a certain amount of emissions
during a commitment period. The holder of the quota could then choose at what time, during
the commitment period, the emission should occur.
The Kyoto Protocol accepts banking of emission reductions which implies that if a country’s
emissions during one commitment period is less than its assigned amount, the difference can
be added to the assigned amount for that Party for the subsequent commitment periods. This
flexibility should also be reflected in the design of the tradeable quota market. To the same
extent as countries are allowed to bank emission reductions across periods, they should be
allowed to bank quotas across periods.
4.4.3 Country-specific quotas
It has been argued, inter alia by Mullins and Baron (1997), that it may be necessary to
identify the country of origin of the quotas in order to facilitate accounting of emissions for
determining compliance. However, a system where all trade in quotas have to be reported to
an international agency, identifying buyers, sellers and the amount traded could equally well
facilitate the accounting of emissions. A system for identification of the quotas’ country of
origin would in that case be unnecessary.
However, country-specific quotas are one method for preventing countries from selling more
quotas than they intend to compensate by increased abatement nationally. If the holders of
quotas must, to some extent, be responsible for the country of origin’s compliance there will
be different prices on the quotas from different countries of origin depending on the
countries’ compliance. This could prevent countries from cheating because that could, if
verified, cause a fall in the price of their quotas for future budget periods.
                                                  
14 Quotas, which give the right to repeated emissions over subsequent periods, can for instance specify an
entitlement to emit a certain amount of CO 2 in each of the subsequent budget periods specified in a climate
protocol. Hagem and Westskog (1996) studies how quotas which give the right to repeated emissions can reduce
the adverse effect of market power, compared to quotas that define the right to a certain amount of emissions in
a fixed year or over a certain time period.
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Non-compliance will not necessarily be a result of planned cheating. The country not being in
compliance will nevertheless be punished through a fall in its quota prices in the future if the
buyers of quotas must, to some extent, be responsible for the country of origin’s compliance.
However, this system may lead to limited trade because the quota buying country will need to
collect information about the selling country before trade can take place and consequently the
transaction costs of the system are increased.
An alternative way of limiting non-compliance is to require that all transfers of emission
quotas across boarders have to be approved by an international institution (as we suggested in
section 3.4). The punishment for not being in compliance can be restrictions on trade in
future commitment periods.
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5 Discussion of the performance of a trading
regime
The previous chapter provided an overview of the basic structure of markets for emission
trading. The goal of this chapter is to discuss the main advantages and disadvantages of
emission trading in its different forms. The aim of the chapter is to clarify and break down
this discussion as much as possible. Technical terms are therefore kept to a minimum.
In the discussion, we must distinguish clearly between transboundary emission trading
between governments and domestic emission trading between companies and institutions
within the different countries. 15 This distinction is fundamental because the arguments for
and against emission trading are not the same whether we discuss the first or the second
mentioned types of emission trading. One reason for this partitioning of the discussion is that
these two types of emission trading have to be evaluated against different backgrounds. When
discussing transboundary emission trading between governments the question at stake is to
what extent the Kyoto Protocol should allow the quotas to be traded.
When discussing domestic emission trading, the starting point of the discussion is quite
different. The Kyoto Protocol has allocated greenhouse gas quotas to all Annex B countries.
The governments now have to decide whether their national quotas should be allocated
further domestically. An alternative is to use another market-based instrument like emission
taxes right from the beginning. Hence, at the domestic level allocation of quotas and emission
trading has to be discussed critically in relation to emission taxes. That discussion is quite
different from the discussion at the international level, where quotas already are allocated.
Although we emphasize the difference between international and domestic emission trading,
some arguments are nevertheless common. The cost-saving potential that could be exhausted
by emission trading is one example of this. We take that quite general discussion applicable
to both types of emission trading in an appendix to the report. Section 5.1 discusses whether
some large participants in the quota markets, by strategic behavior, will reduce the cost-
effectiveness of quota markets. Transboundary emission trading is discussed in further detail
in section 5.2, while domestic emission trading vs. taxes is discussed in section 5.3.
5.1 Inefficiency due to market power and transaction costs
The potential for reductions in total abatement costs through emission trading is the main
argument for allowing such trade. In this section we will discuss some factors that reduce the
cost-saving potential of quota trading. Tradeable quotas have been much studied in the
literature and researchers foresee numerous obstacles to such trade.
Tietenberg (1985) gives a thorough analysis and review of the literature on tradeable quota
systems. A theoretical feature of a perfectly competitive market of quotas is that cost-
effectiveness is achieved regardless of the initial allocation of quotas. This implies that the
allocation of quotas across countries following from the Kyoto Protocol does not influence
the cost-effectiveness of a tradeable quota regime. A perfectly competitive market for quotas
minimizes the total cost of the sum of abatement, for all possible distributions of quotas, and
hence economic costs, across the participating countries. However, several factors might
                                                  
15 As mentioned in the previous chapter transboundary emission trading could also take place between
companies or other institutions in the different countries.
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reduce the cost-effectiveness of a tradeable quota scheme. One is that some large agents
through strategic behavior are able to influence the price, i.e. take advantage of their market
power. Another factor is transaction costs. Both of them will be discussed in this section.
5.1.1 Market power
In a competitive market, the agents are by definition “price-takers”, which means that they
can not, by their behavior, influence the prices. However, if an agent is a large seller/buyer of
quotas, she knows that her supply/demand for quotas will have an influence on the market
price. Some large countries, for example the USA and Russia, might dominate the
international quota market. The international quota market will therefore probably not be
competitive. A large seller of quotas will sell too few quotas and a large buyer of quotas will
buy too few quotas compared to a cost-effective distribution of abatement across agents.16
It is not possible to say generally whether the Nordic countries will loose or gain if there are
countries with market power in the quota market. That depends on whether the large agent,
are sellers or buyers of quotas. A large buyer would give likely quota buyers, as Denmark and
Norway, advantages through its effort to keep the quota price low. According the distribution
of quotas given by the Kyoto Protocol and the projected emissions in the future (discussed in
section 7), USA will be a large buyer of quotas and Russia will be a large seller of quotas. A
further development of the numerical model is, however, necessary before we could be able
to estimate these two countries possibilities to influence on the quota price.
Hahn (1984) shows that the efficiency loss from market power in a tradeable quota market
depends on the initial allocation of quotas. Hence, there is no longer separability between
considerations of equity and efficiency in the quota system, as we would obtain in a
competitive market of quotas.
As already mentioned, market power is only a problem if there are some large seller/buyers
of quotas. If all participants in the quota market are trading small amounts of quotas relative
to the total amount of quotas traded, they are all “price–takers” and the problem of market
power would disappear. An increasing number of small countries participating in quota trade
would reduce the problem of market power. In a worldwide trading regime it is therefore less
possibilities to exercise market power than in a regime with trade only between a limited
number of countries.
The problem with market power is also an argument for letting each producer and importer of
fossil fuels to a country operate in the tradeable quota market rather than countries, as this
will surely increase the number of participants in the quota market. There are, however, two
main reasons why this would not necessarily eliminate the problem of market power. Firstly,
many of the importers and producers of fossil fuels would probably have the possibility of
acting strategically in the quota market as well. Many of them have large global market
shares. The market power problem could be reduced, but it would probably not disappear.
Secondly, if a government has the ability to act strategically when it is trading in the quota
market, it can still be acting strategically if its importers and producers of fossil fuels instead
are traders of quotas. By regulation of the national fossil fuels taxes it can affect the supply or
demand of quotas in the international market of tradeable CO 2-quotas, and hence be able to
exercise market power as before.
                                                  
16 In a study by Westskog (1996) it is shown that with some allocation rules set up by Western European
countries to involve Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe with no obligations to reduce CO 2-emissions in
the trading of quotas, the efficiency loss from market power can amount to a 10% increase in the total costs of
reducing CO2-emissions.
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The problem of market power is probably more relevant for domestic trade in quotas,
especially within small countries, than in a global trading regime (or in a trading regime
among Annex B countries). The problem of market power should therefore be taken into
consideration when the Nordic governments choose among national policy instruments in a
possible initial phase of a trading regime (see table 3.1). The number of potential quota
traders will probably be small in all Nordic countries. It will be a very costly system, in terms
of transaction costs, if quotas were allocated to all emitters of GHGs. This would for instance
imply that all households had to ensure that they had a sufficient amount of quotas before
they could drive their cars or heat their houses. This would be a very costly system both
because it is time consuming for the consumers and it would be costly to monitor. Quotas
would therefore most likely be distributed to national energy suppliers. However, since there
are a limited number of national energy suppliers within the Nordic countries, the problem of
market power may arise.
Although the cost-effectiveness of the quota market can be reduced due to some agents
exercising market power, it is not a fundamental disadvantage. The main part of the cost-
saving potential of emission trading is probably nevertheless going to be exploited.
5.1.2 Transaction costs
Transaction costs can also reduce the cost-effectiveness of a tradeable quota market. Stavins
(1995) identifies three sources for transaction costs in tradeable permit markets:
· The cost of providing information about trading partners
· The expenses incurred in connection with trade negotiations, for instance the cost of time,
fees for brokerage and legal and insurance services
· The authorities’ monitoring and enforcement costs
The magnitude of these transaction costs will depend on the structure of the market and the
extent to which transactions require approval by the authorities. Under a well-functioning
market, the agents do not have to search for trading partners. All agents will know the market
price for quotas and the price conveys all the information the agents need for their decisions.
However, at least in an initial phase of a tradeable quota regime, where perhaps only a limited
group of countries negotiate trading, the transaction costs may be significant.
Increasing the number of potential traders and establishing formal trading exchanges could
significantly reduce the transaction cost. A trading regime may, however, increase the
monitoring and enforcement costs of the Kyoto Protocol. As discussed in section 5.2.1, we
recommend that an international institution should be designated to approve all quota-trade
(at least in an initial phase). Such a system will imply some costs. However, the cost of this
monitoring system will probably be of minor importance compared to the potential gains
from trade.
This leads to the conclusion that transaction costs may be significant in an initial phase of a
trading regime, but these costs will probably be of minor importance when the trading regime
is well established.
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5.2 Transboundary emission trading – will it benefit the
environment?
The appendix A provides a numerical example in order to explain the cost saving potentials
of emission trading. Section 5.1 discussed to what extent the cost saving potentials could be
reduced if there are one or a few very dominant participants in the emission trading market
and if there are high transaction costs. In this section we will draw the attention to factors that
can reduce a tradeable quota regime’s ability to combat global warming. Firstly, we will
discuss to what extent quota trading might aggravate problems with compliance. Secondly,
we will discuss the implications of the fact that some countries may receive quotas well in
excess of their business as usual emissions. Thirdly, we will discuss whether emission trading
might reduce the climate agreement’s ability to stimulate research and development on new
renewable energy.
5.2.1 Emission trading and compliance
Problems regarding monitoring and compliance are fundamental for any climate treaty.
Whether or not emission trading is taking place, the treaty requires monitoring of the
emission reduction efforts in the different countries and there has to be some sort of sanction
mechanism.
Nevertheless, monitoring and sanction mechanisms might be of greater importance if
emission trading is allowed. Emission trading can increase the potential economic gains from
non-compliance and the environmental consequences of non-compliance could be enhanced.
Let us illustrate this using the numerical example in the appendix assuming that only country
A, the quota seller, is a cheater. After the trading agreement is signed, country A is
committed to reduce its emissions more than in the case without trading, while country B
could reduce its emissions less.
If there is no effective sanction mechanism in place, country A will neglect its emission
reduction commitments. Consequently, the total emission reduction will be limited to three
million tonnes of CO 2. If emission trading had not been allowed the total emission reduction
would at least have been five million tonnes of CO 2. Furthermore, if country A as a cheater is
completely rational, it will have incentives for selling more quotas than the two million
tonnes assumed initially. This number was calculated on the basis of planned compliance. If
non-compliance is no longer a part of the plan, further quota sale is going to take place. The
result could be that no emission reductions would take place at all.
Assuming that only country A is a cheater and a cheater completely without scruples is a
simplification. It is perhaps more realistic that both countries would consider cheating if the
net gains are high enough.
It is therefore not obvious that emission trading will increase the problems concerning
compliance. Country B could for example be willing to cheat if emission trading is not
allowed, because the gains from cheating then are large. When emission trading is allowed,
country B’s costs related to compliance are reduced. Hence, it could consider the costs related
to loss of reputation as more costly than the abatement costs, and consequently fulfills its
commitments. However, the gains from cheating for a country with high national abatement
costs could also be increased by emission trading because the country could choose to be a
seller of quotas which it has no intention of compensating by national abatement.
The conclusion from the general discussion above is that although emission trading increases
the potential for cheating, it is not possible to state generally that emission trading will
increase the problems related to compliance. Whether quota trade will enhance the problem
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of cheating depends on the different countries’ attitude to non-compliance. The barriers to
cheating are probably not equally distributed among countries.
The emission-trading pattern is likely to be dominated by an export of emission quotas from
the EIT-countries to the traditional OECD-countries. It is reasonable to assume that most
countries will seek to be in compliance with the protocol. However, some potentially large
sellers of quotas are in a difficult economic situation. For instance Russia face severe
problems with its national economy. Selling quotas could be an important source for foreign
earnings. In the case of countries with large economic problems it might be too optimistic to
expect that sale of quotas will be met by increased national abatement efforts. Hence,
emission trading might enhance cheating and lead to less global abatement unless there is a
sanction mechanism, which prevents countries from cheating. With the lack of such a
mechanism limiting the amount of quotas each country is allowed to sell can reduce the
problem of cheating.
5.2.2 “Hot air”
The Kyoto Protocol has probably provided some countries with emission limitations above
their business as usual (BAU) emissions. The (positive) difference between the emission
limitations and the BAU emissions is often refereed to as “hot air”. According to the
scenarios presented in chapter 7, at least Russia and probably also some other EIT-countries
will have “hot air”.  Quota trading implies that these countries will sell these “excessive”
quotas. Increased emissions from the countries buying the quotas are in this situation not met
by reduced emissions from the countries that are selling their “excessive” quotas. The
consequence is that total global emissions are larger than they would have been in a situation
where the quotas were non-tradeable. We refer to this as the problem of “hot air“ trading.
The problem of hot air trading can, in theory, be avoided by limiting trade to countries that
“without doubt” have received quotas below their BAU-emissions. It is, however, important
to note that it is almost impossible to prove that a country have hot air. The reason for this is
that the Kyoto Protocol specifies emission targets for a time period in the future (2008-2012).
Estimates for future emissions, especially from the EIT-countries, are very uncertain.
Furthermore, due to the Kyoto Protocol the BAU-emissions in the first commitment period
will never be observed. If one observes that emissions in the time period shortly prior to 2008
is below the emission limitations set out in the Kyoto Protocol it is more or less impossible to
say whether the low emissions are due to low BAU emissions or to implemented abatement
measures. It is of course in the interest of the country to claim that the emission reductions
are due to implemented abatement measures if that implies that the country is allowed to
trade quotas.
Furthermore, the countries that most likely have hot air (the EIT-countries) probably also
have the lowest abatement costs. Excluding these countries from quota trading would
therefore increase total cost of the protocol significantly. It is in other words a trade-off
between some hot air trading and increased cost of the protocol.
Above we discussed the possible impact on global emissions of hot air trading for the first
commitment period (2008-2012) in isolation. It is, however, important to keep in mind that
the Kyoto Protocol accepts banking of quotas. This implies that if some countries have hot air
in the first commitment period, and they are restricted from sale of quotas because of this,
they will bank the hot air to the next commitment period.
If the countries the next commitment period have BAU emissions above the emissions
limitations set for that commitment period (not yet decided), intertemporal transfer of hot air
will imply that the emission from these countries would be higher than they would have been
if banking was not accepted. Consequently, since banking is accepted, hot air trading in the
first period will in the end not lead to higher global emissions in the long run than if trade
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was not allowed. (We assume that countries that have hot air in the first commitment period
in some future commitment periods will have emission limitations below their BAU
emissions).
5.2.3 Negative effect on technological development within energy efficiency and new
renewable energy?
Although economists are able to draw relatively strong conclusions about the potentials for
reduced abatement costs through emission trading, the long-term consequences are less well
understood. It is important to stress that the direct emission reductions achieved through a
protocol specifying emission limitations only to the Annex B countries will be unsatisfactory.
The emissions are likely to continue to grow in the rest of the world. Through the leakage
effect the emissions in the developing countries is even likely to be increased as a result of
the implementation of abatement measures in the Annex B countries. If nothing occurs which
make new renewable energy technology more competitive relative to fossil fuels, the
accumulation of CO2 and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will continue despite any
climate protocol limiting the emissions of the Annex B countries. Hence, an essential
question is whether a climate protocol will be able to encourage research and development of
new renewable energy.
It is difficult to give good advises on how a climate agreement should be designed in order to
promote research and development of new renewable energy production, because economic
theory so far gives ambiguous advises at this point. How to encourage technological
development in general is the subject of professional dispute among economists. Strong
conclusions at this point will nevertheless be weakly based.
It is in spite of this reasonable to believe that a climate agreement that commits the rich
countries to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases, not least the USA and other leading
economies considered to be at the ‘technology frontier’, could have an important impact on
the technological development just mentioned. If countries on the technology frontier are
forced to limit their use of fossil fuels, it is likely that this will stimulate relevant research and
development. The result could be new technological solutions that will constitute new ‘no
regret options’. In turn that could bring about reduced use of fossil fuels also in other parts of
the world not being committed to reduce their emissions. Hence, although abatement
measures limited to the traditional market economies will have a small immediate effect on
global emission of greenhouse gases, the effect in the long term due to development of new
technologies might be considerable.
A major result of allowing emission trading is probably that the EIT-countries will be net
sellers of quotas, while the traditional market economies as a whole will be buyers. In other
words, emission trading is likely to stimulate to increased abatement in the EIT-countries,
and reduced abatement measures in the traditional market economies. The question is how
this will affect the technological development.
The EIT-countries are in general probably far from the technology frontier. Hence, emission
trading is likely to bring about increased abatement in countries far from this frontier and
reduced abatement measures in countries at or near the frontier. To a large extent it is
reasonable to say that emissions of greenhouse gases in the EIT-countries could be brought
about just by investing in technology that is already well known through large scale use in the
traditional market economies. Abatement measures in these countries would therefore not
necessarily encourage technological development within new renewable energy, at least not
at the same extent as in the traditional market economies. The result could be that emission
trading could cause higher emission in the long term, compared to an agreement with the
same set of national quotas not traded.
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As emphasized above, we are now in an area of uncertainties. The above thoughts are to
some extent speculative. The long term technological development of new renewable energy
might turn out to be of greater importance to global emissions of greenhouse gases than the
direct emission reductions that will follow from the Kyoto Protocol. However, how this
technological development should be effectively encouraged is difficult to answer. We
discussed above the possible negative impact of technological development of transferring
quotas from EIT-countries to the industrialized countries. On the other hand we know that
emission trading can significantly reduce the cost of a climate protocol. This implies, other
things being equal, that there are more resources available for research on technological
development. Consequently, we are very careful drawing strong conclusions about possible
connections between emission trading and technological development.
5.2.4 Concluding remarks on emission trading and the environment
In this section we have pointed towards some factors that might cause a protocol which allow
emission trading, to lead to higher emissions than if trading was not allowed. The starting
point for our discussion was the differentiated emission limitations for the first commitment
period agreed on in the Kyoto Protocol. However, it is important to have in mind that the
Kyoto Protocol will not enter into force unless at least 55 Parties to the Convention, which
accounted in total for at least 55 percent of the total CO2 emissions for 1990 from developed
countries, ratify the protocol.
Since emission trading significantly reduces the countries’ protocol costs, restriction on trade
may imply that the protocol will never enter into force. Furthermore, emission trading may
imply that the Parties accept higher ambition level for emission reductions in future
commitment periods. If that is the case, the possible adverse effect on the environment of
emission trading, as we discussed above, could be more than offset by higher ambition level
for global abatement.
5.3 Domestic emission trading vs. energy taxes
As we emphasized in the introduction to this chapter, allocation of tradeable permits in the
national arenas should be considered in relation to other suitable instruments, not to mention
emission taxes. This section will provide input to those considerations. We will in the
following discuss the differences between a national permit trading regime and a national
emission tax regime with respect to cost-effectiveness, distribution of costs in theory and
practice, and the performance of the two different systems under an international climate
agreement.
5.3.1 Cost-effectiveness
National emissions taxes imply that national emissions of GHGs are taxed by the national
governments. The emission tax will specify the amount that has to be paid per unit CO 2-
equivalents emitted. The Kyoto Protocol covers the emissions of all GHGs not covered by the
Montreal Protocol. The locations of the emissions of the different GHGs are not directly
observable. However, anthropogenic emissions of CO2 are directly linked to the use of fossil
fuels and land use changes. To reduce emissions of CO 2 one may impose instruments
(tradable permits or taxes) on the use of fossil fuels and land use changes.
Observing emissions of other GHGs, for instance, N 2O and CH4, is more complicated since
the emissions are more technology-specific, and varies with, among other things the
combustion conditions. Other policy instrument (for instance direct regulations of production
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technologies) may then be more effective. The choice of other domestic policy instruments
than permits and taxes will, however, not be discussed in this report. Tradable permits or
(and) taxes will probably be the most important policy instruments since these instruments
effectively reduce the emissions of CO 2, which is the most important GHG.
We know from economic theory that if the emission tax is identical for all sources of
emissions, the climate policy is cost-effective. The tax system ensures that abatement is
distributed cost-effectively across emitters. Hence, both a national tax regime and a national
tradeable permit regime can ensure a cost-effective national distribution of abatement.
5.3.2 Distribution of cost
A tax regime can, in principle, lead to all possible outcomes for distribution of costs across
the emitters, through compensating side payments. The cost–effectiveness of the tax system
is maintained as long as the compensation is not linked to the emissions. Hence, an option is
that the emitters pay a tax per unit emissions and is later redistributed a certain percent of the
total tax revenue. The rule for redistributing the tax revenues determines the distribution of
costs among the emitters. If the tax revenue is not redistributed to the emitters, the tax regime
follows the “polluter pays principle”.
In a tradeable permit regime, where the permits are distributed directly to the emitters, for
example employing “grandfathering”, the distribution of costs is built directly into the policy
measure. The permit has a value, which in a tradeable permit regime is identical to the market
price of the permits. The rule for allocating permits determines the distribution of cost among
the emitters.
In short, (under complete information) it is possible to design a tax regime that leads to
exactly the same distribution of costs among the emitters as a tradeable permit regime.
However, although the two systems, in theory, can lead to exactly the same distribution of
costs across emitters, redistribution of tax revenue to the emitters is seldom used in practice.
Hence the two systems will generally differ regarding the distribution of costs across emitters
and the generation of public revenue (tax revenue received by the government).
5.3.3 Public revenue
At the national level, it should be considered as an important aspect of the chosen policy
instrument whether it generates public revenue or not. Let us give an argument for that: All
national communities have a public sector that is financed primarily by taxes on labor and
capital income. If we for a moment ignore the potential benefits from these spending
programs, the taxes tend to ‘distort’ economic behavior. That is, they reduce employment and
investment below levels that would maximize the welfare of the households. For example,
employers are likely to hire less labor if social security taxes make employees more
expensive. Similarly, capital gains and corporate income taxes reduce the incentives for
individual to save and for firms to invest in new production capacity.
If environmental policy instruments that generate public revenue are chosen, the revenue
could be used to reduce other taxes in the economies. That would reduce the distortions in the
level of employment and production. Hence, choosing environmental policies that generates
public revenue has an additional advantage.
Emission taxes will generate public revenue. Permit systems could also generate revenue if
the permits are allocated through auctions. In fact, if the permits are auctioned and all buyers
pay the price offered for the last permit sold, the public revenue will be identical to the public
revenue generated by a tax system. If on, the other hand all buyers pay the price they offer for
permits during the auction, the public revenue generated will be larger than in the tax
CICERO Report 1998:1
Emission Trading under the Kyoto Protocol
34
system.17 Direct allocation of permits, for example “grandfathering”, will not generate public
revenue. Hence, with respect to the generation of public revenue, emission taxes or permits
allocated by auctions should be preferred.
5.3.4 National climate policy under an international climate agreement
In this section we compare the use of tradeable permits and emission taxes in the case of an
international climate agreement. We will consider the advantages and disadvantages of the
two different policy instruments in the possible different phases of a global trading regime
explained in section 3.4.
Phase 1
We assume that international emission trading in this phase is limited. The governments can
not buy/sell as many permits as they would have done in a situation without trade restrictions.
The governments have to impose policy measures that ensure that they are in compliance
with the agreement, given their limited possibility for trade in quotas. The Kyoto Protocol
sets restrictions on the national cumulative emissions during the commitment period 2008 to
2012. If the national governments choose to use tradeable permits domestically, they could
allocate permits to national emitters immediately after the Kyoto Protocol entered into force.
In that case trade in the permits which give a right to emit a unit CO 2–equivalents in the
period 2008-2012, could start at once and continue to the end of the commitment period
(2012).18,19
The advantage of starting trade in permits so soon is that the emitters well in advance will get
an idea of the cost of emission in the future (2008-2012). However, due to uncertainty about
the Business-as-Usual (BAU) emissions, and future abatement costs, the emitters will face a
great deal of uncertainty regarding the price of permits in the future and their own need for
and valuation of emission permits. The price on the tradeable permits will probably change
over time, as the traders receive more information. However, by using tradeable permits, the
governments ensure that the target for national emissions is achieved.
If the governments instead use taxes in order to be in compliance with their commitments,
they should announce to the emitters that they will face a tax on emissions from the year
2008. When the emitters know well in advance that they will face a tax, they have time to
gradually adjust to the new conditions. The level of the emission tax that will be necessary to
achieve the national emission limitations will be difficult to determine precisely due to
uncertainty about the BAU emissions and future abatement costs, will. In order to meet the
national targets for emissions, the tax level will probably have to be adjusted during the time
period for the emission budget.
In the case of tradeable permits, the prices on permits will change over time as the emitters
receive new information about relevant factors for the price (BAU emissions and abatement
costs). In the case of emission taxes, the tax rate will change over time as the authorities
receive new information about BAU emissions and abatement costs. Hence, both systems
will imply that the emitters will face a great deal of uncertainty regarding the future cost of
emissions. This uncertainty can make it more difficult for the emitters to make investment
                                                  
17 We ignore that the buyer may act strategically during the auction.
18 A small number of the total permits could be withhold and sold/distributed to new entries of emitting firms in
the future to avoid hoarding of permits in order to prevent new entries. This policy is used in the US SO 2
allowances program, discussed in section 8.2.1.
19 The Kyoto Protocol states that considerations of commitments beyond 2012 shall be initiated by the Parties by
2005 at the latest(article 3.9) The  government can hence when such commitments are agreed distribute quotas
for the subsequent time period.
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and production plans, and frequent changes in the estimated costs of emissions increase the
adjustment costs.
If the emitters have more information about the relevant factors for future cost of achieving
the emission target than the authorities, a tradeable permit regime may imply less variation in
the permit price over time than in the tax rate over time. This will tend to favor a tradeable
permit regime relative to a tax system. On the other hand, the authorities may be more
capable to predict the appropriate emission tax, than the emitters are to estimate the price on
permits. Due to uncertainty emitters may hoard permits, which leads to limited trade in
permits. This reduces the cost effectiveness of a tradeable permit regime. Furthermore, as
discussed in section 5.1.1, in the Nordic countries there are relatively few emitters, which will
be allocated permits. This implies that some emitters may exercise market power, which
reduces the cost-savings of a trading regime.
Phase 2
Let’s now consider the national climate policy in a situation with no trade restrictions
between Annex B countries. If the market for permits has been operating for some time the
knowledge about abatement costs are probably better, and it is reasonable to assume that the
international permit price will be relatively stable.
If the government in the Nordic countries prefer to continue to use emission taxes, it is now
optimal to set the national tax rate equal to the international price on quotas. 20 The national
government has to ensure, by international trade in quotas, that the national emissions
following from the tax rate plus the purchase of quotas/minus sale of quotas are in
compliance with the national emission limitation in the climate agreement.
If the national tax rate is set higher than the international quota price, this means that the
marginal abatement cost is higher nationally than internationally. In that case it will be cost-
effectively for the country to emit more, by reducing the national tax, and compensate the
increased emission by purchasing quotas on the international market. If the tax rate is set
lower than the international price on quotas, the country would reduce its total cost of the
climate agreement by raising the tax rate, abate more nationally and sell correspondingly
more quotas on the international market.
If the Nordic countries use tradeable national permits as their policy instrument, a cost-
effective policy is to ensure, through international trade in quotas, that the national price of
permits is identical to the international quota price. In that case the national marginal
abatement cost is identical to other countries’ marginal abatement costs, which is a cost-
effective climate policy for the Nordic countries. If the national permit price is above the
international quota price, the governments should decrease the national cost of the climate
agreement by buying more quotas in the international quota market. If the national permit
price is below the international quota price, the government should sell quotas on the
international market until the national permit price, and hence marginal abatement cost, is
identical to the international quota price, and hence the international marginal abatement
costs.
If the Nordic countries use tradeable permits as the national policy instrument, the
governments can allow national emitters to exchange their permits with the international
tradeable quotas their receptively governments hold and hence trade directly on the
international market. The benefit of this is that the governments do not have to be involved in
quota trading. However, in a well functioning international market for quotas, the transaction
                                                  
20 If the quota price fluctuates, the tax rate can be set equal to the expected average quota price over a certain
time period. The intervals between tax rate adjustment can thus be longer than the intervals between changes in
the international quota price.
CICERO Report 1998:1
Emission Trading under the Kyoto Protocol
36
costs are probably low, and the benefits of letting the emitters trade directly is therefore
limited.
5.3.5 Conclusions regarding the choice between taxes and tradeable permits
One can not, in general, state that one of the policy tools should be preferred. Both lead to a
cost-effective distribution of abatement nationally, given competitive markets. Furthermore,
governmental trade on the international quota market can ensure that the national cost of
being in compliance with the agreement is minimized under both systems. There are
however, three main reasons why the Nordic countries probably should prefer taxes.
Firstly, emission taxes generate public revenue. With existing distortionary taxes, this gives
an option for the governments to reduce the national cost of an international climate
agreement through a national redistribution of taxes. Secondly, taxes are a well-established
policy instrument in the Nordic countries in general and these countries have furthermore
experience with CO 2 emission taxes. Tradeable permits, on the other hand, are so far not used
in the Nordic countries. Initiating a tradeable permit regime may therefore involve higher
transaction costs at least in an initial phase. (This is also a reason for choosing taxes rather
than auctioning permits, even though the latter policy also will generate public revenue.)
Thirdly, in order to reduce the transaction costs of permit trade, the permits must be allocated
to national suppliers of carbon-based fuel and large emitters of other GHGs than CO2,
included in the climate agreement. In the Nordic countries there will only be a limited
number of permit traders in such a system, which may imply that some emitters exercise
market power in the national permit market in the first phase of an international GHG trading
regime.
5.3.6 Combining tradeable permits and emission taxes
A combination of tradeable permits and emission taxes is another option that could be
considered. Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Finland have all introduced CO 2 taxes. So far the
CO2 taxes in the Nordic countries are not equalized across all sources for CO 2 emissions.
There are several exemptions from the CO 2 tax either for whole industries, for some sectors
and/or for the use of fossil fuels as raw material in the process and manufacturing industries.
The argument for this policy has among other things, been that a tax on the competitive
industries will imply a reduction in competitiveness and one fears that the decrease in
emissions nationally may be partly offset by increased emissions abroad.
This argument is no longer valid in an international climate agreement, where all countries
shall be in compliance with their national caps for emissions. In that case, a cost-effective
climate policy implies that all sectors of the economy should face the same emission tax.
However, the consideration for the national industries’ competitiveness can be perceived as
more important than achieving a cost–effective distribution of national abatement. Taxes
imply a higher financial burden on the industries than emission permits distributed freely.
Governments may fear that part of the competitive industry will move their production
abroad if their cost of the national climate policy is high. The governments could for this
reason prefer to distribute tradeable permits to the competitive industries and tax the
emissions from the non-competitive industries and households. 21 This policy implies that the
competitive industries pay less for their total emissions than the other sectors and must
consequently be perceived as an indirect subsidy to the competitive industries. It should be
                                                  
21 If the allocation of permits is based on historical emissions, the use of tradable permits leads to exactly the
same decisions regarding geographical allocation of production as a tax system. In order to ensure that the
production is not moved abroad as a consequence of the national climat policy, the distribution of free pemits
has to depend on current and future national production in the competetive industry.  The use of tradable permits
will in that case not lead to a cost effective distribution of national resources.
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noted that if the governments want the competitive industries to pay less of the cost of the
climate agreement than the other sectors of the economy, this could also be achieved through
identical emission taxes across all sectors. In that case the governments must repay the tax
revenue from the competitive industries to the same industry through some kind of subsidy.
In the initial phase of a global emission trading regime a combination of tradeable permits
and emission taxes would probably also imply that the abatement costs differ across sectors.
It is difficult to find the amount of permits distributed to parts of the industries and the
national emission  tax that exactly lead to the same marginal abatement cost across all sectors
and ensure national compliance. As discussed above, the Nordic countries may also face the
problem of market power in the permit market in this initial phase of a global trading regime.
In the second phase of the trading regime the governments should set the national emission
tax equal to the international quota price. Furthermore, governments could make the national
permits held by (part of) the industries interchangeable with the quotas held by the
government. Hence, both the government and the competitive industries could trade on the
international quota market.
Using both policy instruments is likely to increase the transaction costs. Hence, the
governments should at least after a pilot phase choose one of the instruments. In the Nordic
countries we will emphasize the advantages of the established system with carbon taxes.
If other Annex B countries introduce cost–effective CO2–taxes, there is less reason for
compensating the competitive industries for their CO 2–tax in order not to weaken their
competitiveness. In general, there is usually not in the interest of any country that all
countries subsidize their competitive industries. In order to contribute to the achievement of
international cost-effective climate policy, the Nordic countries could consider to give their
emitters equal economic conditions. That implies that the CO 2 tax is equalized across all
sources for emissions or that the CO2 quotas are sold/auctioned to the emitters. The tax
revenue/income from the auction could be distributed back to the economy through a
reduction in other taxes.
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6 The cost saving potential of a global trading
regime
In this chapter we will give a short overview over some important empirical studies related to
the cost saving potential of emission trading with CO 2 quotas.22 Several studies have pointed
out the differences in CO 2-abatement costs across countries, and hence the scope for cost
savings by an efficient distribution of abatement across countries.
There are two main methods for estimating the costs of reducing emissions of CO 2: Bottom-
up studies and top-down studies. Bottom-up studies are micro-based analyses. These studies
estimate the costs related to the introduction of new less polluting technologies in the
production of goods and services. Top-down studies, on the other hand, estimate the cost of
emission reductions by the use of macro-economic general equilibrium models. A typical
approach is to introduce a CO2 tax in the model, which is sufficient to achieve a certain
reduction in the use of CO2, and then calculate the cost as the resulting reduction in GDP.
The bottom-up studies tend to estimate lower abatement costs than the top-down studies. One
reason for this is that bottom-up studies often find that the costs of mitigation are negative for
a significant amount of emission reductions. This implies that there are several so-called “no-
regrets” options for emission reductions. The top-down approach, assume on the other hand
that all profitable energy saving investments have been implemented. Abatement costs are
therefore usually non-negative, even for small amount of abatements. 23
It is the differences in abatement costs across countries that are important for the cost saving
potential of a CO2–quota trading regime, and not the absolute magnitude of abatement costs.
Both the top-down studies and the bottom up studies find that abatement costs related to CO2
differ significantly across countries. UNEP (1994) employs bottom-up studies for a
comparison of abatement costs in some developing countries, and Kram and Hill (1996)
employ the same approach for a comparison of abatement costs in selected industrialized
countries. They find that the costs of abatement differ widely among countries, both in
developing and industrialized countries.
Several studies based on top-down models have calculated the cost saving potential for global
trade in quotas. The global models for abatement costs usually divide the world into a few
regions. The Edmond-Reilly model (see Barns et al. (1992)), the Manne-Richels model (see
Manne (1992)) and the OECD model GREEN (see Oliveira-Martins et al. (1992b)) have
compared the cost of achieving a global abatement target through cost-effective abatement
across regions with a system of a given percentage reduction in each of the regions. Dean
(1993) gives a comparison of the cost-reductions due to trade in emission quotas in the case
of a two- percent annual emission reduction relative to baseline in the different models.
All models show gains from emission trade. The largest gain is found with GREEN, where
the global output loss is halved from two percent to one percent of global GDP in 2020. 24 A
recent study by Richels et al. (1996) compares the estimates of potential gain from quota
trade in four global models. On average, the model's estimate that the global trade in quotas
has the potential for reducing the cost of a carbon constraint by two-third.
                                                  
22 So far there is a lack of studies of  abatement costs for the non- CO2 GHGs in the litterature.
23 In the case of existing distortionary taxes, the top-down calculations may also find that reducing emissions,
through changes in the tax system, is profitable (so called “double dividend”). “Double dividend” effects are
included in the numerical examples presented in the next section.
24 The Manne-Richels model provides figures for carbon taxes in the no-trade and the trade case, but not GDP-
figures.
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The Kyoto Protocol accepts so far emission trading only between Annex B countries. It is
therefore of interest to evaluate whether trade in CO 2-quotas only among developed countries
also has a large potential for cost savings. Mullins and Baron (1997)  refer to a study by
Manne and Oliveira-Martins (1994) which estimates the cost reductions of trade in quotas
among developed countries (Annex B Parties to the Climate Convention). The study is based
on the GREEN-model. The developed countries are divided into seven regions. The study
looks at a stabilization scenario at 1990 level in the year 2050 applied unilaterally with
regional carbon taxes. The cost of this policy is compared to the total cost of achieving the
same reduction target through tradeable quotas among developed countries. They show that a
tradeable quota regime will reduce the cost by approximately 50 per cent.
Regional taxes imply that abatement is carried out cost-effectively between countries within
regions. Hence, if marginal abatement costs vary significantly between countries within
regions, the global models that divide the world into regions will underestimate the potential
gains from an international trading regime compared to a situation where all countries meet
their targets only through national abatement. In the study by Manne and Oliveira-Martins
(1994) EU is one region. Barrett (1992) estimates, by the use of a bottom-up approach, that the
cost of implementing the European Union's stabilization target for CO 2 emissions (as of 1992) is
50 times less expensive with cost -effective abatement, compared to a requirement that each
member state stabilizes its own emissions.
In chapter 7 a numerical analyses of the gains from trade among Annex B countries is
presented. According to these calculations, the total cost of the Kyoto Protocol can be
reduced by approximately 95 per cent if there is free trade in quotas compared to a situation
with no trade in quotas.
The above mentioned studies of gains from trade are all based on competitive well-
functioning markets for quotas. However, quota trade may for some time, before a market is
established, be based on bilateral or multilateral negotiations. This may reduce their degree of
cost-effectiveness. Bohm (1997) carried out an experimental study of gains from bilateral
trade among four Nordic countries. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden established
national negotiating teams consisting of experienced officials or experts appointed by their
respective Energy Ministers. Prior to the negotiations, all the national teams estimated their
negotiation–relevant social abatement costs, which they disclosed to an outside team of
experts. In addition to the technical costs of abatement, the social abatement costs also
included political considerations concerning the employment and income distribution effects.
National teams negotiated bilaterally over a four–day period, communicating by fax.
A noteworthy result from this experiment is that even though the national teams did not have
full information about each other’s social abatement costs, the negotiating process realized 97
per cent of the potential maximum cost savings. (The maximum cost savings is what would
have been attained by a emission trading market under perfect competition). This implies that
even if there is no well established competitive market for quota trade, bilateral agreement
among a limited group of countries could significantly reduce the total abatement cost.
However, the transaction costs – information seeking about the other countries’ abatement
costs and four days of negotiations – are higher than if quotas were sold on a stock exchange.
In the experiment the national teams had quite good knowledge about each of the countries’
technical abatement costs since all countries had published abatement costs studies. Because
of this knowledge they had a pretty good idea about which countries would be sellers and
which countries would be buyers of quotas and to some extent the other governments
strategic interests. This knowledge will certainly ease the negotiations. Due to several studies
of abatement cost in Annex B countries, such information would probably also to some
extent be available in a situation where an increased number of Annex B countries negotiated
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about quota trade. It is therefore possible that a large part of the potential gains from trade
could be harvested also in an initial phase of a quota-trading regime.
To sum up, the literature shows large potential economic gains from emission trading, both
on regional and global basis. However, it should be noted that actual gains from trade might
differ significantly from the potential gains from trade. The potential gains from trade are
calculated under the assumption of a well-functioning competitive market for quotas.
As discussed in section 5.1 there are several factors that might reduce the actual cost saving
of a trading regime. There might, for instance, be only a limited numbers of traders. In that
case, as discussed already, one faces the problem of some countries exercising market power.
Furthermore in an initial phase of a trading regime there might not be a well functioning
market for quotas and trade will be based one bilateral agreements which may involve high
transaction costs.
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7 Numerical examples related to consequences of
the Kyoto Protocol
7.1 The numerical model – basic characteristics
In the following discussion we will use a simulation model developed at Center for
International Climate and Environmental Research - Oslo (CICERO) to explore how some
essential differences in starting points between the Annex B countries might cause
considerable differences in the costs of achieving the commitments specified in the Kyoto
Protocol. We will furthermore use the model in order to analyze how the distribution of costs
is altered if emission trading between governments is allowed.
The core of the model and the theoretical background are described in detail in Holtsmark
(1997). Cf. also Ringius, Torvanger and Holtsmark (1998). As part of the preparation of this
report the model has been extended and elaborated in order to be capable for the analysis of
emission trading and to take all six gases listed in the Kyoto Protocol into consideration. A
market for emission quotas is built into the model. Furthermore, the model has been
developed in order to be able to treat Sweden, Denmark, and Finland as separate countries.
Originally, the plan was to incorporate also Iceland. Due to lack of some data Iceland is
however so far not incorporated.
The Kyoto Protocol commits the Annex B countries to reduce their emissions of CO 2 and
other GHGs and will therefore consequently directly affect the fossil fuel markets. That is
likely to bring about considerable terms-of-trade changes as one of the results. Together with
the implemented policies, these terms-of-trade changes will also affect the collection of
public revenue in the different countries. These two consequences of the Kyoto Protocol are
analyzed by the use of the numerical model.
Each of the countries is linked together in the model through their relations to the fossil fuel
markets as well as the quota market. The model of the countries’ economic structure is
relatively simple. Important variables here are the fossil fuel taxes, the production and
consumption of oil, coal and gas, the emissions of other GHGs than CO 2, and the amount of
public revenue generated by fossil fuel taxation. Public revenues from fossil fuel taxation are
incorporated in order to capture how national governments' behaviors are sensitive to the size
of the benefits from revenue recycling and how these benefits adjust the distribution of
abatement costs across countries.
The presented numerical examples illustrate how the distribution of gains and losses among
the Annex B parties are sensitive to the different countries’ links to the fossil fuel markets
and their current and potential fossil fuel taxation schemes. The national governments are
assumed to use an emission tax in order to be able to achieve the emission targets specified in
the Kyoto Protocol. The model incorporates to what extent resource rents are transferred from
fossil fuel exporting countries to fossil fuel importing countries, taking benefits from revenue
recycling into account. Furthermore, the structures of the countries’ energy demand, prior tax
distortions and the size of the marginal excess burden of taxation in the different countries are
important factors behind the models' estimates of the simultaneous abatement costs.  25
                                                  
25 Although there is a vast amount of literature on the costs of combating greenhouse gas emissions, a large part
of the literature is focused only on the measurement of the direct abatement costs. Surprisingly, most of the
studies take into account neither the gains from revenue recycling nor the benefits or losses from changes in
terms-of-trade (cf. Ekins (1995) and Hoeller and Wallin (1991)). Some examples of model studies taking terms-
of-trade effects into account are Burniaux et al. (1992), DFAT and ABARE (1995). Unfortunately none of these
studies analyzes the benefits of revenue recycling. Several other studies, for example Jorgensen and Wilcoxen
(1993), emphasize on the other hand the importance of taking revenue recycling into account, but ignore the
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It should be emphasized that the model used is a partial and static one, and the damage costs
from climate change are not incorporated into the model. 26 The fossil fuel prices are
determined within regional and global fossil fuel markets. The oil and coal markets are
assumed global, while three regional natural gas markets are built into the model. One market
is in North America where both USA and Canada are producers of gas with a net export of
gas from Canada to USA taking place. Russia and Europe are included in a second gas
market. The third gas market is found in the East-Asian/Pacific region.
7.2 Abatement costs and protocol costs
The purpose of the model simulations presented in this and the following sections are firstly
to give an idea about how emission trading in different forms could alter the countries total
costs, i.e. abatement costs and protocol costs, cf. definitions in section 7.3. Secondly, we also
want to provide some information on possible absolute levels of the abatement and protocol
costs. Although the numerical examples are useful to both these purposes, one should be
careful when interpreting the results.
It is important to underline that not least the absolute level of the different countries
calculated abatement costs are difficult to predict, especially when we look several years into
the future. The absolute level of the abatement costs will for example depend on the
technological possibilities for switching to new renewable energy sources at the actual point
in time. The economic costs connected to new renewable energy are changing rapidly and are
therefore hard to predict without a considerable degree of uncertainty when we look forward
to the first commitment period.
The model is, as already mentioned, static. In this study we use the model to give us
information about annual abatement costs in the first commitment period, which is 2008-
2012. Technological development is likely to reduce the abatement costs before these points
in time are reached. Other changes in the world economy might also adjust the costs.
Although we are fully aware of the likeliness of such changes to take place we have not
incorporated such a technological development.
Figure 7.1 presents the models estimates of the marginal abatement costs of reducing
emissions of GHGs. Sweden’s high, marginal abatement costs are explained by the relatively
high fossil fuel taxes in this country (in 1990) and the low consumption of coal and reflects
furthermore the fact that electricity is produced almost without use of fossil fuels in Sweden.
The high abatement costs in Norway can be explained by similar reasons. The somewhat
lower average fossil fuel taxes in Norway (in 1990) explain why the estimated marginal
abatement costs are lower in Norway compared to Sweden. The model estimates the marginal
abatement costs in Denmark to be higher than in Finland, although Denmark uses coal
                                                                                                                                                             
terms-of-trade effects of several countries implementing climate policies at the same time. The contribution of
our analysis is to give some indications on how the costs of the Kyoto Protocol will vary among the Annex B
countries when dead-weight-loss from taxation, gains from revenue recycling and terms-of-trade effects are
taken into account. This is done while taking into account the effect of all the Annex B countries implementing
efficient abatement measures at the same time.
26 Dynamic aspects of the countries' climate policies, as emphasized by for example Nordhaus and Yang (1996),
are therefore not taken into account in the present analysis. Some relevant structural characteristics of the
national economies that are emphasized by other studies, as for example DFAT and ABARE (1995) and
Burniaux et al. (1992), are also ignored. In contrast to the mentioned studies the present study, however,
analyses in further detail the countries' fossil fuel taxation policies under the implementation of the Kyoto
protocol, and to what extent these taxation policies influence the distribution of costs and benefits of an
agreement. Unlike the mentioned studies, the present study directs the focus towards the links between a
possible climate agreement and both the current and potential fossil fuel taxation policies in the light of public
budget constraints.
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intensively, not least in power production. The explanation is connected to the structure and
level of fossil fuel taxes in these countries in 1990. The fossil fuel taxes in Denmark were
relatively high and are assumed to have led to relatively efficient use of fossil fuels.  27 The
average oil tax in Finland was, on the other hand, in 1990 at a level equal to about 50% of the
average oil tax in Denmark in that year, cf. appendix C.
The marginal abatement costs in Japan are relatively small at low emission-reduction levels,
but increase relatively fast when further emission reductions are assumed to take place. The
initial low abatement costs are due to the low fossil taxes in 1990, while the rapid increase in
marginal abatement costs are explained by the assumed somewhat inelastic demand for fossil
fuels in Japan. EU has implemented considerable higher oil taxes than the USA and Canada.
That should lead to higher abatement costs in Europe. However, the intensive use of coal in
                                                  
27 This argument is based on the assumption that high fossil fuel taxes leads to high costs of curbing CO 2-
emissions further. It is reasonable to assume that the tax already has caused an efficient use of fossil fuel. Hence,
low-cost options for reduced consumption of the fuels are already exploited.
Some technical key features of the numerical model
· The model is of the top-down category.
· The different national fossil fuel consumption patterns together with the size of the
fossil fuel taxes in 1990 are the main factors behind the estimated abatement costs
functions in the different countries and regions. High fossil fuel taxes give rise to
high, estimated abatement costs. The higher was the share of coal in countries’ total
fossil fuel consumption in 1990, the lower are the estimated abatement costs.
· The cost functions do not represent detailed analyses of the technical possibilities
for emission reductions in consumption and production. Bottom-up-models with
emphasis on such options are likely to give rice to abatement cost functions different
from the cost functions presented in this study .
· The Annex B countries maximise country specific welfare functions subject to
national CO 2-emission constraints and public budget constraints. The marginal
excess burden of taxation is set to 0.10 in the US and Norway, 0.20 in Sweden, 0.10
the other OECD-countries, and 0.05 in the EIT-countries.  1
· The governments are assumed to use fossil fuel taxes on consumption as their
climate policy instrument.
· The national welfare functions measure net benefits from both private and public
sector consumption of oil, coal and gas and profit in production of fossil fuels.
· The national abatement costs are equal to the reduction in consumers’ surplus in
fossil fuel consumption minus the benefits from revenue recycling.
· There are global markets for oil and coal and three regional markets for gas. Supply
elasticities are 0.75 in the gas and oil markets and 1.0 in the coal market.  The direct
demand price elasticities vary between -0.21 (oil in Finland) and -0.57 (gas in the
EIT-countries). The demand cross price elasticities varies between 0.0 and 0.30.
· In the cases where emission trading is allowed a quota market is also included. The
quota price is endogenous and secures equilibrium in the quota market.
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Europe draws in the other direction. Hence, the model finds that the abatement costs are
relatively similar in Europe and the USA and Canada.
Figure 3: Estimated marginal abatement costs (USD pr. tonnes CO2 equivalent) of
reducing emissions of GHGs. Benefits from revenue recycling are taken into account,
but terms of trade changes are not.
Figure 7.2 shows the models estimated total cost curves for the different countries, and group
of countries before terms of trade-changes are taken into account. The costs are measured as
income loss in percentage of the GDP in 1990. The benefits from revenue recycling are
included. That means that these cost curves take into account that the use of fossil fuel taxes
in the climate policy will generate public revenue, which could be reimbursed to the private
sector. It is assumed that the reimbursement implies reduction of other taxes. Reduced tax
rates will in general increase the efficiency of the economies and hence adjust the net cost
curves downwards.
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In order to understand the differences between the cost curves in figure 7.1 (marginal costs in
USD pr. tonnes CO2 equivalents) and figure 7.2 (total costs in percentage of GDP) we should
keep in mind that in figure 7.1, we measure absolute costs on the vertical axes, while we
measure the total costs relative to the countries’ respective GDP in on the vertical axes in
figure 7.2.
The change from absolute costs to costs in relation to GDP explains also to a large part why
the cost curve of the USA now is elevated compared to the cost curve of EU, while it was
slightly below in Figure 7.1 which measured marginal costs in absolute terms.
Figure 4: Estimated abatement costs. Terms of trade-changes are not taken into
account, but the benefits from revenue recycling are included
A remark should also be made about the fact that the cost curves of especially EU, Japan,
USA, the EIT-countries are below zero at considerable GHG emission reduction levels. In
other words, the model ‘finds’ considerable ‘no regret’ options in these regions and countries.
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This is due to the inclusion of benefits from revenue recycling. The revenues collected as a
result of national climate policies are used to reduce other taxes and consequently the
economic efficiency is increased.
7.3 Some possible consequences of the Kyoto Protocol
Based on the above-presented model, we will present numerical examples in order to
illustrate some economic consequences of the Kyoto Protocol and especially how
transboundary emission trading will alter the distribution of costs. The numerical examples
will furthermore provide some ideas about which governments are likely sellers and buyers in
the quota market and a likely level of the quota price.
When the governments are free to buy or sell parts of their emission quotas in a market, they
are assumed to reduce their domestic emission to the level where the marginal abatement
costs are equal to the quota price. Hence, in the case with free emission trading marginal
abatement costs are equal both across gases and countries and equal to the quota price.
It is important to underline that the numerical examples do not take into account that the
Kyoto Protocol states that quota import should be supplemental to domestic abatement
efforts. In the actual model framework the governments simply minimize their costs, and do
not take any other considerations into account. It should furthermore be remarked that the
possibility for joint implementation projects through the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM) and its influence on the quota market is not taken into consideration here. If,
however, emission rights could be achieved cheaply trough CDM, this could constitute a
ceiling for the quota price.
Table 2: BAU emissions of CO2 (million tonnes) and other greenhouse gases (OGHG,
million tonnes of CO2 equivalents) in 1990 and 2010, the Kyoto quotas and the emission
reduction commitments.
Emissions
1990
 CO2
Emissions
1990
 OGHG
Sum
emissions
1990
BAU
Emissions
2010
 CO2
BAU
Emissions
2010
OGHG
Sum 2010
BAU
emissions
Quota Reduction
commit-
ment
USA 4957.0 784.0 5741.1 6097.1 720.6 6817.7 5339.2 1478.5
Canada 462.6 103.1 565.8 550.5 110.1 660.7 531.8 128.8
EU12* 3121.5 749.9 3871.4 3304.6 592.8 3897.4 3581.4 316.0
Denmark 60.2** 19.6 79.8 66.0 17.6 83.6 63.0 20.5
Finland 53.9 10.9 64.8 63.3 12.0 75.3 64.8 10.5
Sweden 61.3 11.2 72.4 72.3 12.4 84.7 75.3 9.4
Norway 35.5 18.6 54.1 49.0 15.5 64.5 54.6 9.9
Other
OECD
47.2 12.9 60.2 46.7 11.2 57.8 55.9 1.9
Russia 2388.7 594.8 2983.5 2221.5 594.8 2816.3 2983.5 0.0
Other EIT 1690.9 428.5 2065.4 1711.8 317.7 2029.5 1968.7 60.8
Australia/N.Z. 314.4 202.2 516.7 402.3 179.3 581.5 552.1 29.4
Japan 1155.0 46.1 1201.1 1325.9 41.5 1367.5 1129.1 238.4
Sum 14348.3 2981.9 17276.2 15911.1 2625.4 18536.5 16399.5 2304.2
* EU-15 minus Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
** Adjusted to account for import and export of electricity and variations in temperature. The actual emissions
were 52.3 mill. tonnes CO 2.
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Annex B in the protocol specifies flat rate emission reductions within the European Union
member countries. However, in accordance with article 4 the EU member countries are free
to redistribute the commitments between them selves. In the presented numerical examples
the internal EU-distribution agreed upon in June 1998 is therefore used as our starting point.
That means for example that Denmark is assumed to reduce its emissions by 21% below the
1990 level, Finland must return to the 1990-emission while Sweden is allowed to increase the
emissions by 4%. The Nordic EU-countries are treated separately, while the model
aggregates rest of the EU-countries to one unit (labeled EU12 in the tables).
The model provides a set of simultaneous abatement cost functions using BAU-emissions as
the starting point. We therefore have to make assumptions about the countries’ BAU
emissions in 2010. We have used emission scenarios presented in national communications
where possible. Some reported emission scenarios appear however unrealistically low. The
BAU emissions of these countries are therefore adjusted upwards to what we se as a more
realistic level, cf. Table 2. Where the emission scenarios are not presented in national
communications, the assumed BAU-emissions are taken from Alfsen, Holtsmark and
Torvanger (1998).
The Russian BAU-emissions in 2010 are assumed to be 7% lower than they were in 1990.
Since the Russian emission quota is equal to the 1990 emissions, we in other words assume
an amount of 167 million tonnes ‘hot air’ from Russia measured in CO 2 equivalents. There
might turn out to be ‘hot air’ also in other EIT-countries, but this possibility is ruled out here
due to both our assumptions about BAU-emissions in 2010 and to the aggregation of the
other EIT countries to one unit.
Four cases are analyzed. Firstly, we look at the case where no emission trading is allowed to
take place. Secondly, we look at a case where only the Nordic countries are allowed to trade
with each other. Thirdly, we extend the trade region to include all the Annex II countries.
Finally, we look at the case where emission trading is free within Annex B.
The distribution of the abatement efforts across the different gases and regions in the four
cases is listed in table 7.2. One should note that in the cases where the EIT-countries are not
allowed to sell emission quotas, the Russian emissions of CO 2 are estimated to be 32-33
million tonnes higher than in BAU. This is a sort of carbon leakage due to the price drop in
the fossil fuel markets caused by the abatement policies in the other Annex II countries. 28
                                                  
28 See section 4.3 for an explanation of the concept ‘leakage effect’.
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Table 3: Abatement of CO2 (million tonnes) and other greenhouse gases (OGHG,
million tonnes CO2 equivalents) in the three scenarios.
          No trade            Nordic trade             Annex II
trade
          Free trade
CO2 OGHG CO2 OGHG CO2 OGHG CO2 OGHG
USA 1407.2 71.3 1407.2 71.3 1080.9 55.8 747.9 39.6
Canada 119.0 9.8 119.0 9.8 81.6 6.9 50.3 4.4
EU12* 291.6 24.3 291.6 24.3 590.4 45.4 409.5 32.6
Denmark 18.1 2.4 12.1 1.7 3.7 0.6 0.7 0.2
Finland 9.5 0.9 19.0 1.8 10.7 1.0 7.9 0.8
Sweden 8.2 1.2 6.5 1.0 1.2 0.3 -0.6 0.0
Norway 7.6 2.3 6.4 1.9 3.0 0.9 1.8 0.6
Other
OECD
1.5 0.4 1.5 0.4 3.9 0.9 2.7 0.6
Russia -32.3 0.0 -32.2 0.0 -33.5 0.0 280.8 34.7
Other EIT 55.1 5.7 55.1 5.7 55.0 5.8 230.2 17.9
Australia/N.Z. 24.9 4.6 24.9 4.6 112.3 16.8 84.8 12.9
Japan 234.0 4.4 234.0 4.4 223.0 4.2 173.4 3.3
Sum 2144.6 127.4 2145.1 126.9 2132.2 138.6 1989.4 147.6
* EU-15 minus Denmark, Finland and Sweden.
Table 7.3 shows the different countries and regions import of emission quotas in the three
scenarios. If emission trading is restricted to the Nordic countries, Denmark is the main buyer
of quotas, while Finland is the primary seller. This result must be seen in relation to the
adjusted built in internal EU redistribution of commitments in accordance with the agreement
from June 1998, which commits Denmark to a 21% emission reduction relative to the 1990
emissions. Norway and Sweden are buying only small amounts of emission quotas in this
situation due to the high quota price, which here is estimated to be USD 47.7 pr. tonnes CO 2
equivalent.
Together with the EIT-countries the European Union is assumed to be the main quota seller
when the trading area is extended. The EU is however going to sell a larger amount of quotas
in the case with the trade restricted to the Annex II area due to the higher quota price in this
case. In the case with trade only among the Annex II countries, the quota price is estimated to
be USD 22.4 pr. tonnes CO2 equivalent. In the case with free trade among the Annex B
countries, the quota price is estimated to be USD 13.5 pr. tonnes CO2 equivalent.
The USA is the main quota buyer due to the high-expected emission growth in this country.
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Table 4: Import of emission quotas and the quota price. Million tonnes CO2 equivalents
and USD pr. tonnes CO2. The three scenarios.
USA Canada EU12 Den-
mark
Finland Sweden Nor-
way
Russia Other
EIT
Australia
and N.Z.
Japan Quota
price*
Nordic trade 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.8 -10.3 1.9 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 $47.7
Annex II trade 341.9 40.4 -
319.8
16.3 -1.3 7.9 6.0 0.0 0.0 -99.6 11.1 $22.4
Free  trading 691.1 74.1 -
126.1
19.6 1.8 10.0 7.5 -482.8 -
187.2
-68.2 61.7 $13.5
* The possibility of achieving quotas through investments in the CDM, might turn out be of large importance
for the final quota price. The CDM as a likely ceiling on the quota price is not taken into account here.
Figure 7.3 provides an overview of the calculated costs of the Kyoto Protocol (the protocol
costs). In these cost estimates both terms-of-trade changes and benefits from revenue
recycling are taken into account. A first impression of the simulation is that the costs of the
assumed climate protocol are relatively low in most of the countries in question, even without
emission trading. We must here keep in mind that this is annual costs of emission reductions.
They will therefore constitute income losses that have to be taken into account every year
during the first commitment period. To some extent there will be costs also in the years prior
to the first commitment period, due to a likely smoothly adjustment towards a situation with
lower emissions.
According to the numerical examples, only Norway experiences net costs above 1% of the
GDP.  This is mainly due to the oil and gas export from this country and the calculated price
drop especially in the oil market following from the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.
Not least important in this respect is the fact that a large part of the profit in this country’s oil
and gas production is directly allocated into public budgets. Norway has imposed especially
high profit taxes in the petroleum-producing sector, but public income is also generated
through direct public ownership in the production of oil and gas. Reduced oil prices in the
world market will therefore bring about reduced public revenue in Norway and hence force
the Norwegian government to increase existing distortionary taxes.
Having a look at the scenario where emission trading is not allowed, a noteworthy result is
that among others Japan, Finland and the non-Nordic EU countries as a group will experience
net gains from the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. This is partly explained by the
considerable terms-of-trade gains that these countries will experience mainly due to a drop in
the producer-oil price resulting from the implemented climate policies together with the
benefits from revenue recycling.
These benefiting side-effects are large enough to outweigh the implemented abatement costs.
This result may however be too optimistic. The most crucial assumption in that respect is the
assumed emission growth from 1990 to 2010 in the BAU-scenario. In three mentioned
countries the assumed growth rates are 13.8% in Japan, 16.1% in Finland and 0.7% in the
EU. Due the rapidly increasing marginal cost curves as emission reductions are increased,
other assumptions with higher BAU emissions would have implied substantially increased
cost estimates in these countries and group of countries.
CICERO Report 1998:1
Emission Trading under the Kyoto Protocol
50
Figure 5: Costs of the Kyoto Protocol. The EU-differentiation agreed upon in June 1998
is internalized. Terms-of-trade effects are taken into account.
Although Sweden according to the simulations should expect some net costs of the Kyoto
Protocol at least if there are restrictions on the quota marked, the estimated Swedish costs are
small. The main explanation is the burden-sharing rule within EU, which allows Sweden to
increase its emission from 1990 to the first commitment period by 4%. That implies an
emission reduction from the BAU-level of 11%.
This number should be related to figure 7.1 and 7.2. From figure 7.2 we see that an emission
reduction in Sweden of 11% implies abatement costs below 0.2% of GDP. The Swedish costs
are nevertheless significantly smaller due to this country’s gains from lower fossil fuel prices.
It is here important to underline that abatement activities are expensive in Sweden. If the
estimated price drop in the oil market does not take place and if the Swedish BAU-emissions
are underestimated, the Swedish protocol costs would have been substantially higher.
Denmark is committed to reduce the emission to a level 21% below the 1990-level. With our
assumptions about the BAU-emissions in 2010 this implies an emission reduction from BAU
of 25% and consequently Denmark experiences higher abatement costs than Sweden and
Finland (emission reduction from BAU of 14%).
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With our assumptions, Norway and Canada are hardest affected due to these countries’ role
as fossil fuel producers and their relatively high estimated BAU-emission growth from 1990
to 2010.
The USA experiences relatively high costs, especially when this country is not allowed to
buy quotas. This is in contrast to the relatively low marginal cost function of the USA
compared to EU, cf. Figure 7.1 and 7.2. An essential factor is however the terms of trade
changes and the countries’ role in the fossil fuel markets, as well as the expected BAU
emission growth. The USA is a considerable producer of oil, coal and gas. Hence, while
Japan and the EU experience large terms of trade gains due to price drops in the oil and coal
markets, the US does not experience terms of trade gains of the same order of magnitude.
Figure 6: Costs when the terms-of-trade effects are not taken into account.
In the case with free emission trading, the USA is a buyer of permits. In the case where the
EIT-countries are allowed to take part in the emission trading, the USA is buying emission
permits equal to 13% of the initial number of permits. Hence, the US emissions in that case
are estimated to be 5% higher in 2010 that they were in 1990.
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Especially Denmark, Norway, Canada, USA, Australia and the EIT countries will receive
significant benefits from emission trading. This is related to both especially high or low
abatement costs in these countries as well as either a strict or flexible emission target.
Countries with more average abatement cost patterns will not benefit to the same extent from
emission trading. The emission targets of Australia and Russia are for example likely to give
these countries some flexibility and the possibility to attain gains from quota sale.
Figure 7.4 shows the estimated costs when terms of trade changes are not taken into account.
This diagram constitutes a good starting point for increased understanding of the estimated
abatement costs in figure 7.3, which include terms of trade changes. The costs of the fossil
fuel exporters are reduced while the costs of the net importers are increased if we compare
with the costs including terms of trade changes. We should furthermore note that some
countries according to the numerical examples would experience net gains from the Kyoto
Protocol even when terms of trade changes are not taken into account. This is basically a
result of income from quota sales together with the inclusion of benefits from revenue
recycling.
Figure 7: Estimated price changes in the fossil fuel markets.
Finland is here an interesting example. Finland’s significant net gain in the case where
emission trading is restricted to the Nordic countries is explained by the income from quota
sales and a high quota price in this case. Finland experiences however still a slightly positive
net gain also in the case without emission trading. This result is closely related to the
numerical assumptions. With our numerical assumptions, this country is committed to reduce
its emissions by 14%lative to the BAU emissions in 2010.
Having a look at figure 7.1 we see that in Finland abatement of this size of order to a large
part could be achieved by application of no regret options (se explanation on page 43).
Furthermore, even after full exploitation of the potential for no regret options, the marginal
abatement costs are still small in this country. We should here be aware of the fact that no
regret options are estimated to be of higher importance in Finland compared to the other
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Nordic countries. The number of no regret options in Finland could of course be
overestimated. In that case the model simulations draw a too optimistic picture of the costs of
Finland.
Figure 7.5 provides an overview of the estimated price changes in the fossil fuel markets that
are likely to follow from the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. From a Norwegian point
of view it is interesting that free emission trading is likely to enhance the price drop in the
European gas market. The reason is the redistribution of abatement efforts between countries
that will follow from free emission trading. The redistribution of abatement efforts will
change the demand for fossil fuels.
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8 Practical experiences with quota trading
In this section we will give a short overview of some relevant practical experiences with
emission quota/permit trading both on an international level and on a domestic level. In this
section the word emission “allowances” and “permits” are used interchangeably for
domestically allocated emission rights. In accordance with the definitions made in section
3.2.1 quotas are on the other hand used for the national emission limitations specified in a
protocol.
8.1 Experience from international trade with quotas
There is so far limited experience with international trade in pollution quotas. One important
reason for this is that the geographical emission patterns usually matters for the degree and
distribution of environmental damage. This implies that increased emission of transnational
pollutants in one country can not be offset by a similar amount of decrease in emission from
another country without influencing the distribution of damage across countries. Montgomery
(1972) developed a cost-effective design of a quota system in the case where the location of
emissions does matter.
However, as discussed in Tietenberg (1995), Montgomery’s ambient tradeable permit system
is complicated to implement because an emitter would have to acquire separate permits for
each affected sector.29 Contrary too most transboundary pollutants, greenhouse gases are well
mixed in the atmosphere. Hence, the location of emissions does not effect the impact on the
climate. One precondition for international trade with quotas is therefore in place.
CFCs are greenhouse gases that also have a depleting effect on the ozone layer. CFCs are
controlled by the Montreal Protocol (UNEP (1987)). An interesting feature about this
protocol is that it allows Parties to transfer production quotas for CFCs to other Parties for the
purpose of industrial rationalizations. 30 In the following section we have a further look at this
protocol.
8.1.1 The Montreal Protocol
The Montreal Protocol (MP) sets a timetable for gradual elimination of production and
consumption of certain Ozone Depleting Substances (ODS), among them CFCs. 31 Limits for
production and consumption was “grandfathered “ to Parties on the basis of their 1986 levels
of production and consumption. Consumption is defined as production plus imports minus
export. The Montreal Protocol does not accept trade in consumption quotas between Parties
in general. However, EU-member countries are allowed to jointly fulfill their obligations with
respect to consumption.
                                                  
29 The problem of differing spatial impacts of emissions is for instance faced by the European “Second Sulphur
Protocol” aimed at reducing SO2 emissions below “critical loads”. The location of SO 2 emissions can greatly
effect levels of acid rain and some areas may have less tolerance for acid rain than others. No trading rule under
the “Second Sulphur Protocol” has yet been approved.
30 The Montreal Protocol defines industrial rationalization as “transfer of all or a portion of the calculated level
of production of one Party to another, for the purpose of achieving economic efficiencies or responding to
anticipated shortfalls in supply as a result of plant closure”.
31 The original protocol was signed in 1987. The protocol was later amended in London 1990 and Copenhagen
1992.
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The Montreal Protocol’s rules for international transfer of production quotas have been
developed gradually. Initially the transfers were not allowed to increase the individual
production by more than 10% to 15% of the 1986, except for Parties with very low
productions. The London Amendments of 1990 removed this restriction and the remaining
rules for transfer of quotas between parties are:
· The total combined levels of production of the parties concerned are not allowed to
exceed the production limit agreed on
· The UNEP Ozone secretariat must be notified of transfers, their term, and the periods for
which they apply
· The protocol does not accept transfer of quotas to non-participating countries.
National/regional implementation of the Montreal Protocol
The Montreal Protocol does not set restrictions on the use of national policies to meet the
targets as long as their production and consumption are in compliance with the limits set by
the Montreal Protocol and that international trade of production quotas follows the rules set
out in the protocol.
Approximately 70 per cent of world production of ODS in 1986 were produced in EU and
USA (Klaassen (1996)). EU has translated the national limits of production and consumption
into individual limits for ODS producers and consumers. EU rules allow for international
transfers of consumption and production quotas within the region and trade in production
quotas with non-EU countries. The United States’ government has allocated their national
ODS production quotas to ODS producers and their national consumption quotas to ODS
producers and importers. USA rules allow for national trade in production and consumption
quotas and international trade in production quotas.
Trade under the Montreal Protocol
Klaassen (1996) and Mullins (1997) have studied the transfers of quotas under the Montreal
Protocol. They point out that it is difficult to get access to information about international
trade, because, according to Mullins (1997), the information is commercially sensitive. As of
January 1994, the ozone secretariat had not received any notification of transfers of
production levels, but international trade had taken place.
According to Klaassen (1996), EU-companies had a traded volume of 20 000 –30 000 tonnes
per year of ODS in 1992 and 1993 (which correspond to 11-15 percent of EU’s 1991
production). Much of the trade was among European member states. United States companies
traded 35 000 tonnes of ODS per year internationally in the same period (which corresponds
to 27 per cent of their 1991 production). Klaassen (1996) did not find that trade by companies
outside EU and USA had occurred in 1992/93.
Quota-trade and cost-effectiveness:
According to Klaassen (1996) the market for CFC production seems to have been active.
Approximately 10 per cent of actual production have been transferred internationally. The
cost savings from international quota trade is however unknown. There are nevertheless
several factors that reduce the cost effectiveness of the tradeable quota system under the
Montreal Protocol.
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The Montreal Protocol does not set restrictions on national laws regarding quota trade.
According to the amendment of the Clean Air Act in USA in 1990, domestic transfer of
quotas is permitted provided the amount of remaining quotas held by the seller is reduced by
the amount transferred plus 1 percent. This insures that trade result in greater total reduction
in production than would otherwise occur, but limits the cost reducing potential from
domestic quota trade. Rules regulating the international transfer of allowable production
levels are stricter than rules for domestic trade.
The production allowed to the transferor is reduced not only by the amount transferred, but
also by the difference between allowable and actual production in USA. This creates a bias in
favor of domestic rather than international trade. According to Mullins (1997) the domestic
trade for certain ODS was approximately nine times larger than the international trade in the
period 1989 to 1995. Both the domestic and international restrictions on trade reduce the
cost-effectiveness of a tradeable quota scheme.
Market power
Production of ODS has been concentrated in a few companies. Klaassen (1996) reports that
Du Pont de Nemours serves 25 per cent of the world market and ICI’s market share is 15 –20
per cent. This implies that market power in the quota market can reduce the cost-
effectiveness of quota trade, as discussed in section 3.2. However, there is not available
sufficient information to analyze whether companies have exercised market power in the
quota market.
Limited trade in consumption quotas
With the exception of EU countries, consumption quotas can not be traded internationally.
This implies that the Montreal Protocol does not ensure a cost–effective distribution of global
abatement of CFC consumption. This restriction may however not be very significant for the
cost-effectiveness of tradeable quota scheme. According to Klaassen (1996), in order to keep
contacts with their customers, EU companies did not make use of their right to trade
consumption quotas internationally.
Uncertainty regarding credits from trade with developing countries.
According to the MP, developing country parties are allowed to increase their production
limits by 10 to 15 per cent to meet basic domestic needs and they are allowed to delay
meeting compliance deadlines for 10 years. This implies that these countries currently have
no binding production quotas. As argued by Klaassen (1996), this could lead to a situation
where developing countries increase their “baseline” production level and transfer this to
other countries. This would effectively increase worldwide production. He claims, however,
that transfer with developing parties appear to bear the risk of being rejected instead of
leading to an increase in production.
8.1.2 Relevant experience for the design of a tradeable CO2 quota scheme
The Kyoto Protocol does not set restrictions on each Parties choice of policy instrument
domestically to ensure that national emissions are in compliance with the amount of national
quotas. This may imply that countries are less reluctant to accept a tradeable quota system.
However, national laws regarding quota trade (as implemented in USA) may reduce the cost
effectiveness of a tradeable quota scheme.
The rules for international transfer of quotas under the Montreal Protocol developed
gradually. A stepwise approach to emission trading is also what we suggest for trade in
GHGs included in the Kyoto Protocol. If countries initially only were allowed to trade a
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portion of their quotas, one could limit the possible adverse affects of a trading regime,
namely that countries sold quotas well in excess of what was met by increase in their national
abatement. Countries that proved to be in compliance with their obligations over a certain
time period could be allowed to trade a larger portion of their quotas in the future. The cost of
this gradual development of the trading regime is that restrictions on trade would not lead to a
cost-effective distribution of abatement.
In the USA consumption quotas were allocated to producers and importers, and not to
consumers. According to a reference in Klaassen (1996) the reason for this is that the large
numbers of consumers (5,000-10,000) would have increased the administrative costs. 32 In the
case of a national trading regime of CO 2 quotas the administrative and monitoring cost of
distributing CO 2 quotas to all consumers would probably be very high. Distributing quotas to
the national energy suppliers could solve this problem.
8.2 Experience from national trade of quotas
Although there is limited experience with international quota trade, quota trade is a widely
used policy instrument nationally, especially in the USA. In the previous section we
discussed national trade under the Montreal protocol within USA. Another example of
emission trade in USA is the trade in SO 2 permits, which will be discussed below. 33
SO2 is an example of a pollutant where the damage caused by emissions is not independent of
where the emissions occur. Emission trading allows for flexible emission patterns and there
are therefore a common concern that tradeable SO 2 permits may lead to so called “hot spots”
of emissions. “Hot spots” means that emissions are accumulated in certain geographical
areas. However, all utilities participating in the US SO 2 trading program must comply with all
other requirements of the Clean Air Act (CAA). The CAA already regulates SO 2 emissions at
local and regional levels to ensure that health and environment quality standards are
maintained. Beyond these regulations, the fact that the geographical source of emissions is of
significance for the damage is ignored in the design of the trading system.
8.2.1 The US SO2 Allowance program
The United States 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments include provisions for SO 2 allowance
trading among electric utilities. The objective of the acid rain program was among other
things, to reduce emissions of SO 2 of approximately 10 million tonnes per year from 1980
emissions levels. The program is being implemented in two phases. Phase I, which began in
1995, is designed to achieve 4.5 million tonnes emission reductions. The second phase begins
in 2000 and will complete the goal of 10 million tonnes emission reductions.
In the first phase of the program the highest emitting electric utility plants (Phase I utilities)
are required to meet an interim ceiling for emissions (5.7 million tonnes). In phase II, the
limits for emissions will not apply only to the phase I utilities, but also to smaller, cleaner
plants. With phase II, a national cap of 8.95 million tonnes of SO 2 is placed on the number of
allowances. The initial allocation of quotas was based on historical production levels
(“grandfathering”) and the SO 2 emission rates. Each allowance is dated and entitles the
holder to emit one tonnes SO2 in the year of issue. Each boiler receives individual annual
emission limits for 30 years from the time they enter the program.
                                                  
32 Hahn and McGartland (1989)
33 In relation to the US SO2 trading regime, the word “allowances” is used instead of “permits”.
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Allowances may be sold, bought and banked, but not borrowed. There are no restrictions on
the portion of allowances that the participants can sell. A special reserve of the annual total
allowances is being sold on an auction held by US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
every year. Furthermore EPA sell allowances directly to newcomers. The auctions and direct
sale reduce the existing utilities’ possibility to withhold allowances in order to prevent entry
of new producers.
In addition to the auctions, quotas are traded between the participants either directly or
through brokers. There is both a market for emission allowances for phase I and a market for
trade of emission allowances for phase II. The sulfur-trading program is expected to lead to
considerable savings in the overall abatement costs compared to a policy where the
allowances where non-tradeable. The cost reduction is estimated to be 40 to 45 per cent over
the lifetime of the program (Klaassen (1996) table 6.3)). This estimate takes into account the
administrative implementation costs and the utilities’ transaction costs.
Trade under the US SO2 Allowance program
Although allowance trading began in 1992, it is too early to make an analyses of how the
trading program succeeded to reduce the costs, since Phase I started as late as in 1995. The
achievement of the potential cost savings depends on how well the market works. According
to Mullins (1997), trade among utilities has steadily increased from 1994 to 1996. The
cumulative total transfer was 1,902 transactions, which represent 34.2 million allowances.
However, most of these transfers occurred between boiler units within companies.
Phase I-utilities, that have been able to reduce their SO 2-emissions, have tended to bank them
rather to sell them. According to Adams (1997) there has been less trading of allowances than
was expected. Initially there was a large discrepancy between the auction price and the
secondary market (trade between utilities) price. However, both prices have fallen and
gradually converged (Klaassen (1996)). The price on allowances for phase I has fallen from
between 180-270 US$ in 1993 to around US$137 in 1995. The forward prices for emission
allowances for phase II are much lower than was expected. This indicates that the cost of SO 2
reductions had been overestimated.
8.2.2 Relevant experience for the design of a tradeable CO2 quota scheme
An interesting feature about the SO 2 trading program is the annual auctions of emission
allowances held by EPA. The auctions are organized partly to address the issue of new
utilities, and for the early auctions, to provide a price signal for allowance prices. A small per
cent of the distributed annual allowances are taken from the allocations made to utilities and
sold at the auctions. Furthermore, private holders of allowances can offer their allowances for
sale at the auction and set a minimum price. The auction revenues are returned to the utilities
from which the EPA withheld allowances. Such a system could possibly be applied in an
international trading regime for GHGs. In the case of tradeable GHG quotas it can be
valuable that auctions are organized initially by an international authority designated by COP
to help create a price signal. In that case countries can offer some of their quotas for sale and
receive their share of the auction revenue in return.
It is important to note that the SO2 trading regime has high, automatic, and well-enforced
penalties of non-compliance. Strict enforcement provisions have facilitated political
acceptance of SO2 trading in USA. An equally high level of punishment and enforcement will
probably be difficult to achieve under an international GHGs trading regime. However, in the
design of a tradeable quota regime it should be considered different measures for increasing
the countries’ cost of non-compliance. This may increase some countries’ willingness to
accept emission trading as some countries’ main mean to fulfill their commitment under the
Kyoto Protocol.
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In the SO2 trading program the emitters have complete information about their future
emissions limits. Each boiler receives individual annual emission limits for 30 years from the
time they enter the program. At the end of each year the government allocates the 31 st year of
allowances. This system implies that all participants are well informed about the total
emission allowances in the future. The certainty about future emission limits together with
the “forward market” for emission allowances for phase II reduces the participants’
uncertainty regarding future prices on allowances.
This information, together with the possibility to freely bank emission allowances, facilitates
the participants optimal planning of emission reductions over time. The Kyoto Protocol
allows for banking of quotas, which increases the flexibility. But it is also important that the
participants agree on emissions budgets for future commitment periods well in advance. If
countries are uncertain about future emission limitations when trade is initiated, the future
quota prices will be very difficult to predict. This may imply that countries are reluctant to
sell quotas because they fear high prices in the future. In that case the cost-effectiveness of
the tradeable quota system can be reduced.
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Appendix A:
A simple numerical illustration of the gains from
emission trading
The motivation for emission trading is the potential for reduced total abatement costs. The
purpose of this subsection is to illustrate in a non-technical way why there are such cost-
saving potentials connected to emission trading. The gains from emission trading are
illustrated with a simple numerical example.
Figure A.1: A simple numerical illustration of the gains from emission trading between
two countries. The columns in the front describe the marginal abatement costs of
country A. The columns in the background illustrate the marginal abatement costs of
country B, but for illustrative purposes these columns are ordered from right to left.
We assume that two countries are both committed to reduce their emissions of greenhouse
gases by five million tonnes of CO 2. We furthermore assume for illustrative purposes that the
abatement could only be done step by step, each step reducing the emission by one million
tonnes of CO2. Each step should be considered as concrete projects or measures, like fuel
switching in an industry or introduction of a new energy-efficient technology in a company.
The two countries’ abatement costs, as described in Figure A.1, are different. The columns in
the front of Figure A.1 describe the marginal abatement costs of country A. 34 The first of
these columns from the left side shows that the cost of reducing the emission in country A by
                                                  
34 More precisely, the additional abatement costs, related to reducing the emissions by one million tonnes of
CO2.
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one million tonnes of CO 2 is USD 10 million. Further emission reduction of one million
tonnes costs USD 20 million (cf. the height of the second column from the left), and so forth.
The cost connected to the last million tonnes this country has to curb is USD 50 million. If
country A should reduce the emission by for example 10 million tonnes the marginal
abatement costs would reach a level of USD 100 millions.
Figure A.2: Total abatement costs. The columns in the front describe the total
abatement costs of country A. The columns in the background illustrate the total
abatement costs of country B, but for illustrative purposes these columns are ordered
from right to left.
The columns in the background illustrate the marginal abatement costs of country B, but for
illustrative purposes, the columns are ordered from the right to the left. This means that the
first of these column from the right shows that the costs of reducing the emissions in country
B by one million tonnes are USD 20 million. The second column from the right shows that
reducing the emissions with another million tonnes of CO 2 will cost USD 40 million and so
forth. The costs connected to the last, fifth, million tonnes country B according to the
commitments has to curb, is USD 100 million.
The cumulative height of the columns reflects the total abatement costs of the countries.
Country A has for example to cover a total cost of USD 150 millions in order fulfil its
emission reduction commitments on its own, while the corresponding cost of country B is
assumed to be USD 300 millions.
The two countries are committed to reduce their total emissions by 10 million tonnes. It is
evident from the diagram that the quotas of two times 5 million tonnes will not bring about a
cost-effective solution. A somewhat larger emission reduction in country A and a
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correspondingly smaller emission reduction in country B will reduce the total abatement
costs. The crucial point is that, when both countries reduce their emissions by five million
tonnes, the marginal abatement costs are higher in country B than in country A. If country A
for example curbs its emissions with another million tonnes of CO 2, the costs will increase by
USD 60 million. Then the emissions from country B could be increased by one million
tonnes of CO2. That would release USD 100 million in reduced abatement costs. Hence, there
will be a net gain of USD 40 millions.
Let us now calculate the total potential gains from emission trading in this case. The cost-
effective solution is found by picking out the set of 10 columns in Figure A.1 with the lowest,
added height. This means that country A should reduce its emission by 7 million tonnes,
while country B should reduce its emission by three million tonnes. 35 The total abatement
cost of country A is increased by USD 130 millions, to a total abatement cost of USD 280
millions. The total abatement cost of country B is reduced by USD 180 millions to a total
abatement cost of USD 120 millions. The total abatement cost of the to countries together is
consequently USD 400 millions. Hence, the total abatement costs of the two countries will be
reduced by USD 50 million compared to the situation with no emission trading, which
represent 12.5 percent of total abatement cost. The total costs are illustrated in Figure A.2.
This simple numerical example illustrates that different marginal abatement costs is the key
to gains from emission trading. When the marginal abatement costs are equalized, the
distribution of abatement is cost-effective. There is no longer possible to reduce the total cost
through trade in quotas.
The size of the costs saved in this numerical example is however relatively small compared to
what could be the case in real world emission trading. In the empirically based numerical
                                                  
35 Further emission reductions in country A at the expense of reduced emission reductions in country B is not
cost-effective, because the reductions would pass the limit where marginal emission reductions are lower in
country A than in country B.
More participants in the numerical example
In the numerical illustration, there were only two participants in the trading system.
Increased number of participants will have several implications. Let us only mention
some important implications.
Let us assume that there is a third country, which has an emission limit and wants to take
part in the emission trading market. If this country experiences marginal abatement costs
even lower than country A, country A could go from being a seller of emission quotas, to
being a buyer. That depends on several circumstances, among other things the exact form
of the third country’s abatement cost curve.
If for example the third country has a huge potential for low cost emission reductions, it
is likely that country A will be interested in buying quotas. If on the other hand the third
country has only slightly lower abatement costs compared to country A, it is more likely
that country A still will be a seller in the quota market, but the sold number of quotas
might be lower. The entrance of the third country could in that case weaken the strategic
position of country A in the quota market, with lower quota price as the result. Hence, it
could be in the interests of country A not to let the third country into the emission trading
market.
We will see an example of such strategic interests in the empirically based numeric
examples presented in chapter 7. There we present a case where the emission trading is
restricted to the Nordic countries. In other cases, the emission trading market is larger.
The extension of the market is clearly in the interests of the quota buyers who are
Denmark, Norway and Sweden, cf. Figure 7.4 .
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examples presented in chapter 7 the case with free emission trading among all the Annex B
countries reduces total abatement costs by approximately 95%. Similar results from other
studies are discussed in chapter 6.
Some further aspects of the numerical example are discussed in the two attached text boxes.
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Appendix B:
Parties listed in the Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol
and their emission limitations
Party   Quantified emission limitation
     or  reduction commitment
(percentage of base year or period)
Australia 108
Austria   92
Belgium   92
Bulgaria*   92
Canada   94
Croatia*   95
Czech Republic*   92
Denmark   92
Estonia*   92
European Community   92
Finland   92
France   92
Germany   92
Greece   92
Hungary*   94
Iceland 110
Ireland   92
Italy   92
Japan   94
Latvia*   92
Liechtenstein   92
Lithuania*   92
Luxembourg   92
Monaco   92
Netherlands   92
New Zealand 100
Norway 101
Poland*   94
Portugal   92
Romania*   92
Russian Federation* 100
Slovakia*   92
Slovenia*   92
Spain   92
Sweden   92
Switzerland   92
Ukraine* 100
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland   92
United states of America   93
* Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.
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Appendix C:
Fossil fuel taxes in 1990 and fossil fuels
production and consumption patterns in the
2010 BAU-scenario*
Production Consumption Taxes
(Mill. tonnes CO 2) (Mill. tonnes CO 2) (USD/tonnes CO2) *
Oil Coal Gas Oil Coal Gas Oil Coal Gas
USA 1655 2695 1131 3102 2311 1338 15.8 0.0 0.0
Canada 354 177 223 298 113 148 31.4 0.0 0.0
EU12 298 828 287 1745 1107 453 66.5 0.1 13.0
Denmark 2 0 0 34 27 5 82.1 25.9 0.0
Finland 0 0 0 42 15 6 41.8 2.2 2.2
Sweden 0 0 0 61 10 2 87.6 38.4 25.8
Norway 427 0 154 39 3 6 47.0 23.9 0.0
Other OECD 0 0 0 43 2 3 49.2 1.0 0.6
Russia 1548 639 1027 749 655 787 0.0 -1.0 -0.9
Other EIT 53 1030 182 455 954 400 0.0 -1.0 -0.9
Australia and
New Zealand
117 540 53 150 203 58 50.1 0.0 0.0
Japan 0 25 5 917 340 118 26.9 0.0 0.1
* The estimated average tax rates are taken from ECON (1995), which presents average fossil fuel taxes in the
OECD countries from 1980 to 1994. The tax rates presented there are based on weighting energy taxes by
product and sector. The information on taxes is based on IEA Energy Prices and Taxes. The information on
taxes has been supplemented with EU’s oil price statistics, ‘Oil Bulletin’ and with direct contact with national
administrations. The weights are based on ‘Basic Energy Statistics’. The Basic Energy Statistics have been
supplemented with oil industry information and EU statistics on the use of leaded and unleaded gasoline and on
the breakdown of heavy fuel oil according to sulphur content (relevant for countries differentiating heavy fuel
oil taxes according to sulphur content). The calculation of the average taxation by sector takes into account the
exempted use of energy within the sector. Concerning gasoline the taxes are for premium gasoline. Taxes for
leaded and unleaded gasoline (where relevant) have been weighted with the consumption of the two qualities.
For countries differentiating the tax between high and low sulphur, taxes are represented by the tax on the
typical quality in industry and power generation.
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